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I. INTRODUCTION 
Anyone who ever wanted to become a lawyer while reading TO 
KILL A MOCKINGBIRD, or who saw law as a tool for responding to 
injustice, probably drew inspiration from the profession’s commitment 
to zealous advocacy.  Zealous advocacy is core to the popular ethos of 
what good lawyering is, and yet for many areas of law, it is only vaguely 
defined, and is honored too often in the breach.  Zeal may be absent 
because it is not part of the legal culture, especially in the under-
resourced, over-burdened court systems affecting some of our most 
vulnerable populations, very much including the court system that 
oversees immigration cases.  Two central ideas this Article explores are 
why the legal culture matters, and what role a well-articulated standard 
and broadly held commitment to zealous advocacy could play in the 
specific context of immigration court. 
Zealousness has at least two manifestations.  One is simply a kind 
of lawyering thoroughness, where lawyers use all tools available to 
advance their client’s interests—and indeed, it is now officially housed 
in the ethical rules under the principle of diligence.  While zeal-as-
diligence is not easy, it is also not terribly controversial.  The other 
manifestation of zeal is in pushing boundaries and taking risks for 
clients, which quickly becomes far more controversial as it calls upon 
lawyers to tiptoe up to the edges of ethically permissible behavior 
instead of remaining in a safe, neutral zone.  Often cast in negative 
lawyer-as-hired-gun-terms, this form of zeal is complex, and may still be 
both client-centered and justice-oriented, especially where clients lack 
KEYES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2015  9:27 PM 
2015] ZEALOUS ADVOCACY 477 
power relative to the system or systems they are confronting.1  One 
example may better explain these two aspects of zeal, and show their 
significance: 
Cynthia had lived in the United States for seventeen years, working as a 
nanny.  Along the way she married, and later divorced, a fellow Jamaican with 
whom she had two daughters.  She called the police on him once during a fight, 
and the police arrested them both.  In court, each accepted a deferred sentencing 
agreement, agreeing to do twenty hours of community service to make the issue 
go away.  Cynthia’s older daughter is excelling at school and won a scholarship 
to a private high school where she plays flute in a traveling orchestra.  Her 
younger daughter suffers from juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, and Cynthia has 
managed her care over the years.  Recently, police pulled Cynthia over for a 
traffic stop while she was driving in the predominantly white neighborhood 
where she works, found that she had two IDs with two different names, and 
placed her under arrest.  They notified immigration enforcement officers, leading 
to her removal hearing because the deferred sentencing agreement constituted a 
domestic violence conviction that made her deportable. 
Now Cynthia is in immigration court.  On any given day in immigration 
courts around the country, dozens, if not hundreds, of immigrants in removal 
proceedings concede the allegations filed by the Department of Homeland 
Security on a charging document called the Notice to Appear, in a process that 
takes only a moment.  Many, if not most, of those immigrants will concede that 
the Government has the legal basis to deport them.  And with that, in less than 
a minute, the Government has met its burden, and the immigrant can be 
deported unless there is some form of relief he or she can seek.2 
But Cynthia’s lawyer did not concede the basis for deportation, even 
though the lawyer knew that she did, in fact, lack status—simply because it was 
still the Government’s burden. Now, instead of the Government proving its case 
within a minute by relying on a concession from the immigrant’s attorney, the 
process stopped and the judge had to hear arguments concerning the sufficiency 
of the Government’s evidence supporting the conviction.  An individual without 
legal immigration status can win her case if the Government cannot, in fact, 
meet its burden, without ever getting to the question of whether the immigrant is 
eligible for any kind of relief from removal.3  Let us imagine that in this case, 
though, the Government was able to meet its burden, meaning the Government 
 
 1  See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004), 
for an excellent overview of zeal and its critics, among other complicated ethical issues.  
Kate Cruse also thoughtfully explores the tensions among client-centeredness, zeal 
and justice in Kate Cruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered 
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006). 
 2  Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1809 (2013). 
 3  The Government can refile charging documents with better evidence in the 
future if it so chooses. 
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had now made its case against Cynthia. 
The story continues momentarily, but note here how this decision 
to deny the charge of removability disrupts norms of performance with 
lawyering that differs sharply from the daily mill of cases churning 
through the immigration removal system.  But this lawyer is simply 
zealously, if unexpectedly, using all the tools she has at her disposal.  
This choice is only modestly controversial—many lawyers argue that a 
duty of candor to the tribunal requires them to concede removability 
if they know that the Government can ultimately amass evidence to 
sustain the charge, or if they think it would be frivolous to litigate the 
charge—but here the lawyer sees this as a weak but not frivolous 
strategy, and worthy of putting the Government to its burden in case 
the proof is not present. 
Cynthia now tries to avoid deportation by showing she is eligible for the 
form of relief known as Cancellation of Removal, an application she 
affirmatively makes to the Government.  She is likely eligible because she has been 
here more than ten years, and her removal would cause “exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship”4 to her U.S. citizen daughter with arthritis.  But 
there is one wrinkle: the application asks about any arrests, and in response to 
that question, Cynthia told her lawyer that she was once arrested for theft for 
taking her ex-husband’s car without his permission.  A guilty plea for this would 
make her ineligible for Cancellation.  Cynthia said her defender “sorted it all 
out” for her, but she does not remember what happened at the one court 
appearance she had, just that the problem seemed to go away. 
The lawyer looked in the criminal courts of Virginia, where Cynthia had 
lived since coming to the U.S., and found no evidence of an arrest or subsequent 
charges.  Between that and Cynthia’s vagueness about what had happened, the 
lawyer decided she had no duty to dig deeper with Cynthia for details that could 
help unearth any conviction that might or might not exist.  The Government, 
despite running Cynthia’s fingerprints through its fairly comprehensive system, 
found no evidence of a theft either.  Cynthia won her case, got a green card, and 
stayed in the U.S. to work and to raise and care for her daughters. 
This second ethical decision, about how far to dig for the theft 
conviction, is more controversial.  Here, the duty to present a truthful 
application to the court conflicted with the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to 
her client, and many lawyers would have erred on the side of 
interrogating the client to be as forthcoming as possible with the 
tribunal.  Indeed, had Cynthia’s lawyer asked her a few more questions, 
she could have found out that the charge was, strangely, adjudicated 
 
 4  This level of hardship is a requirement for one form of relief from deportation, 
Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent 
Residents.  INA § 240B(b)(1)(D); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2013). 
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in family court alongside the divorce itself—and she could easily have 
produced the document that would have made Cynthia ineligible for 
relief.  Her diligence would have resulted in her client’s deportation, 
but the lawyer would have secured the court’s respect for her honesty 
and integrity, something that likely matters profoundly to a lawyer who 
appears before that judge time and time again. 
By contrast, the lawyer ran the risk of being hauled up on ethics 
charges by creeping toward the edge of the murky line between 
knowing about a fact she had a duty to tell the tribunal,5 recklessly 
disregarding the existence of a relevant fact,6 or deciding that there was 
enough ambiguity present that she did not “know” about a conviction.7  
This lawyer’s choice of interpreting unclear rules in favor of her client 
is risky to her, but zealousness, as she defined it, demanded she go with 
that less safe choice. 
There is no question that zealous representation has profound 
consequences in immigration court, where clients may contend with 
prolonged detention, family separation, and ultimately, for many, 
deportation with its many attendant losses.8  Attorneys generally know 
that zealousness is within their box of tools as they represent clients, 
and that it is required by the rules of professional conduct in so far as 
lawyers are to act diligently on their clients’ behalves.  But zealousness 
is often tempered by duties to the tribunal, and by attendant role 
confusion caused by competing duties to clients and the system as a 
whole.  The broader legal context exacerbates these forces, where 
court systems and the ethical rules increasingly favor more conciliatory 
 
 5  Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) requires her not to put forth facts she knows to be false.  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1)(1983). 
 6  The immigration court ethical rules governing the lawyers’ conduct go farther 
than the Model Rules, as discussed in Part 5, infra. 
 7  Comment 8 to Model Rule 3.3 permits lawyers to resolve doubts in favor of their 
clients.  Comment 8 in its entirety reads:  
The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer 
knows that the evidence is false.  A lawyer’s reasonable belief that 
evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact.  A 
lawyer’s knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from 
the circumstances.  See Rule 1.0(f).  Thus, although a lawyer should 
resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor 
of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT.  
 8  This Article does not intend to rank practice areas by difficulty, as other practice 
areas share many of these same challenges and comparable consequences, such as 
abuse and neglect proceedings.  Indeed, as I have shared earlier versions of this Article 
with lawyers in diverse fields, they have all painfully recognized these issues and 
identified closely with the challenges described in this Article.  Clearly, the forces 
against zealous advocacy permeate far more than the immigration bar, and are worthy 
of intensive conversation across legal practice areas. 
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modes of litigation.  Moreover, while some pressures against 
zealousness are endemic to any system with a relatively small number 
of repeat players, others result from by skyrocketing immigration court 
dockets that overwhelm both judges and lawyers for the Government, 
by widespread, powerful narratives that assume everything from the 
feebleness of the constitution in immigration court to the presumed 
removability of the immigrants who appear there.  Indeed, in 
overstretched court systems like this one, it may sometimes seem that 
zealousness is disfavored entirely.  This Article takes the stance, 
however, that given the stakes in immigration litigation, zealousness is 
required for true attorney effectiveness, no matter how difficult, 
uncomfortable, or costly it may be, and therefore lawyers in the 
immigration system urgently need to understand and overcome those 
barriers to zealous advocacy. 
The complexity of these issues, the scope of the consequences, 
and the importance of a well-defined norm of zealousness all call to 
mind the world of criminal defense, which has a split personality 
important to understand.  Although all lawyers are bound by rules of 
professional conduct, criminal defense has a strong history of 
establishing norms that challenge defenders to rise above the ethical 
floor often set by those rules, where effectiveness is defined at a 
minimally effective level.  Defenders have created a culture whereby 
the best defenders stake their reputations on their zeal and on the 
clarity of their understanding that they stand with their clients against 
the weight of other forces in the overall legal system.  It is true that 
examples of poor-quality defenders plague the criminal defense bar, 
and even well-intentioned defenders find themselves unable to live up 
to their desired level of representation because of impossibly high 
workloads.  Moreover, the law itself defines effectiveness far below the 
standards of the best defenders, thanks to the extraordinary 
permissiveness created by Strickland9 and the cases interpreting it, 
which serve to separate legally-sufficient “effectiveness” from truly 
effective lawyering.  Legally-sufficient effectiveness is a terribly low 
standard, while truly effective lawyering is a demandingly high one.  In 
a context where legally-sufficient effectiveness might have become the 
norm, however, defenders have actively sought and defined a much 
higher standard of practice, which involves oftentimes aggressive 
interpretations of the rules of ethics in favor of zealous advocacy.  Part 
II of this Article explores the lengthy, sophisticated debate around the 
justifications (or lack thereof) for such zealousness, looking at factors 
 
 9  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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such as resources, procedural advantages, political and psychological 
advantages, as well as the legitimacy of the immigration court ethical 
rules themselves.10 
True effectiveness (as opposed to legally-sufficient effectiveness) 
is not easy in immigration litigation.  Immigration lawyers11 face a 
constant and varied set of ethical challenges while working in an 
exceptionally difficult practice context: administrative law whose 
complexity is often likened to the tax code; often intransigent 
bureaucracies; limited judicial review; the demanding solo-
practitioner and small-firm business-model that dominates the 
immigration bar; the presence of trauma; complex cultural and 
linguistic barriers; and so forth.  The uniqueness of immigration 
practice also makes it likely that immigration lawyers are less likely to 
be held to high standards than their counterparts in other areas of 
practice, for many reasons, but especially because those who pay the 
price for ineffective assistance are often deported and unable to hold 
counsel accountable.12 
Complicating matters further, immigration practitioners operate 
in a unique form of the adversarial system, lacking some of the critical 
tools and protections—limited though they are—that their closest 
colleagues, criminal defenders, possess.  These limitations certainly 
arise from the different (oftentimes lesser) constitutional protections 
 
 10  Here, this Article applies a framework developed by ethicist and legal 
philosopher David Luban to justify including immigration with criminal defense as 
meriting the choice of “zealous advocacy” and not “litigation fairness” as the baseline 
for resolving ethical dilemmas.  See Part II.B, infra; see also David Luban, Are Criminal 
Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1998). This Article sidesteps the question of 
whether different practice areas might adopt different principles, or whether the bar 
should have a uniform approach to ethics, as this is a subject richly explored and part 
of ongoing scholarly conversations elsewhere. 
 11  I use the term “immigration lawyers,” but as will be discussed infra in Part Bthere 
are several categories of non-lawyers who can practice in immigration court, including 
students, accredited representatives and “reputable individuals.”  8 C.F.R. § 1292.1 
(2008).  Likewise, immigration prosecutors within the Department of Homeland 
Security certainly practice immigration law, but for ease of identification, I am calling 
them prosecutors, and their adversaries “immigration lawyers.” 
 12  This phenomenon is discussed in Part III, infra.  An empirical study would be 
well-merited on this point, but it is interesting here to note that immigrants do have an 
incentive to file bar complaints to get their cases reopened under Matter of Lozada, 
19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988) (permitting a case to be reopened where an 
immigrant demonstrates prejudice from a prior attorney’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel).  Lozada, however, requires that the immigrant still be present in the U.S., 
requires (most likely) that the immigrant has secured a second lawyer to understand 
about the options that may be available under Lozada, and, most important to this 
discussion of incentives for effectiveness, does not require that a disciplinary action 
actually result against the prior attorney. 
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surrounding immigration proceedings, but they also arise from the 
posture of immigration cases themselves.  Specifically, as Cynthia’s 
story shows, although advocates may see themselves as defending their 
clients against removal, they are affirmatively seeking benefits and have 
burdens of proof that can, and often do, put their duties to their clients 
in direct opposition to their duties as officers of the court.  These and 
other ethical issues create ethical dilemmas for immigration litigators, 
but a broadly-held commitment to zealous advocacy would encourage 
litigators to explore and act at the edges of ethically permissible 
behavior to ensure truly effective representation of their clients. 
Part III addresses the question of why this kind of powerful 
standard-setting matters.  Again, the world of criminal defense shows 
how voluntary standards help counteract the erosion of effectiveness 
that occurs when the legally-sufficient understanding of “effectiveness” 
is so poor.  While not halting the forces of erosion, the standards 
provide a healthy counter-force.  Likewise, the articulation of a 
heightened standard of effectiveness for immigration attorneys, one 
that elevates zealous advocacy, could help the practice of immigration 
in numerous ways.  Not only would it bolster, support and encourage 
the work being done by the many excellent, zealous immigration 
advocates currently practicing, but it would provide a measure against 
which the dominant-narrative “bad immigration lawyers” can be 
judged. 
Part IV begins the examination of ways that such a commitment 
to zealous advocacy might help make difficult choices amid the 
challenges of immigration litigation.  Those challenges may be 
grouped into ones where zealousness can make a difference, and those 
where the very structure of immigration law and the ethical rules may 
make truly client-centered zealous advocacy impossible.  These 
dilemmas will help show the ways that immigration law itself challenges 
practitioners from adhering to often conflicting ethical duties, let 
alone achieving a higher standard of effectiveness.  This Article calls 
upon the immigration bar to make zealous advocacy a broadly-shared 
and well-articulated norm of practice.  For the seemingly impossible 
situations, where lawyers simply cannot meet their competing duties to 
the clients and to the court, law reform efforts may be needed as well—
with some as simple as fine-tuning the governing ethical rules.  The 
untenable contrasts and conflicts set forth in this Article require a shift 
in the laws and structures so that lawyers in immigration court have the 
possibility of playing their multiple roles responsibly, something 
precluded by the current laws and structures. 
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II. JUSTIFYING ZEALOUSNESS 
It is broadly understood that the various ethical duties imposed 
upon lawyers are frequently in tension with each other.  At their core, 
many of these tensions exist between those duties owed to the client 
and those owed to the court or legal system generally.  Over the 
centuries, there has been an ongoing struggle between two approaches 
to this central tension.  One approach holds zealous duty to the client 
as the primary duty, one that is only secondarily tempered by duties to 
the court or legal system generally (hereinafter called the “zealous 
advocate” approach).13  The other is an approach where the duties to 
the court and legal system are more important.  This second approach 
aligns the lawyer and the court as sharing the ultimate objectives of 
truth and justice (hereinafter referred to as the “litigation fairness” 
approach).14 
The decline of the zealous advocate model, as noted in Part 1, 
manifests in many ways, but most notably in the revision of rules of 
conduct to minimize or omit references to zeal.  As two lawyers note: 
“The demise and disappearance of ‘zeal’ from our ethical rules is more 
than a matter of semantics.  In fact, it is evidence of a fundamental 
paradigm shift that is and has been occurring in our legal system.”15  
One powerful intentionally-articulated counterpoint is in the practice 
of criminal defense, where zealous advocacy retains its power.  This 
Article now briefly sketches out this debate, describing “litigation 
fairness” and the justifications for it, and contrasting it with the zealous 
advocacy approach, before assessing the extent to which either model 
is appropriate in the immigration court context.  This Article cannot 
possibly do justice to the nuances of the various models or to the 
sophisticated debates among them, but aims to provide just enough 
context to be instructive to those who are not immersed in ethics 
literature to understand that there is a robust alternative framework 
urging lawyers to be less uniquely focused on client-centered advocacy. 
 
 13  Carol Rice Andrews, Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy: A Historical 
Perspective, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (2012).  William Simon underscores the 
longevity of these themes, but notes that they are not either/or propositions: “There 
has never been a consensus about where to draw the line between these two aspects of 
the lawyer’s role, and the two have always been in tension within the professional 
culture.”  William Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1133 
(1988). 
 14  Andrews, supra note 13. . 
 15  Lawrence J. Vilardo & Vincent E. Doyle III, Where Did the Zeal Go? 38 A.B.A LITIG. 
53, 56 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/litigation_ 
journal/2011_12/fall/where_did_zeal_go.html. 
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A. Competing Approaches to Professional Conduct 
1. Alternatives to Zealous Advocacy 
Various approaches to professional conduct recognize the ways in 
which ethical duties sometimes conflict, and choose “first-order” moral 
values, such as truth and justice, as the guiding principle to resolve any 
conflicts, instead of placing zealous advocacy to the client first.16  
Although the variations on this are diverse, for the sake of simplicity I 
will focus on one described as “litigation fairness.”17  As one scholar has 
written, “[t]he lawyer still has a duty to zealously advocate for the 
client’s interest and position, but the duty of zeal should not be allowed 
to be a justification for lawyer behavior that imposes significant costs 
on the legal system and society in general.”18  Fairness to the court 
encompasses such characteristics as reasonable behavior, truth (as to 
both law and fact), and merit (again, as to both law and fact).19  
Premised upon a vision that two adversaries have comparable levels of 
power, litigation fairness suggests that a lawyer may not need to 
unleash every weapon in a brutal struggle for the client’s interests.20 
Carol Rice Andrews has explored this concept in depth, 
considered its long history, and has suggested that a distinct but 
encompassing duty that encapsulates what it means to be fair to the 
court is the concept of “just cause.”21  “Just cause” means assuring that 
an action is “reasonable, honest, objectively meritorious, and properly 
motivated.”22  A French ecclesiastical oath from the thirteenth century 
cautions against knowingly taking cases that are “not just,” and while 
 
 16  Wendel, supra note 1. 
 17  “Litigation fairness” is but one name and approach for multiple critiques of 
zealous advocacy.  A particularly important approach that shares some characteristics 
of this model is that of William Simon who offers deep critiques of what he calls the 
“dominant model” of zealous advocacy, discussed further below, but nicely 
summarized in Wendel, supra note 1.  Compare Andrews, supra note 13, with William 
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1085–87 (1988). 
 18  John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of the Rules of Ethics, 42 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 75 (2013). 
 19  “Over the centuries, the concept of litigation fairness has included different 
duties and standards of conduct, including reasonable behavior, truth, just cause, 
proper motive, and objective merit.”  Andrews, supra note 13, at 383. 
 20  See Richard Marcus, Cooperation and Litigation: Thoughts on the American 
Experience, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 821 (2013). 
 21  Andrews, supra note 13, at 387.  Andrews examines this concern for the 
“justness” of a legal action in an interesting examination of historical records, from 
the Justinian oath, through the French ecclesiastical oaths from the 13th 
century,”[e]very single advocate shall swear that he will faithfully perform his duties; 
that he will not support cases that are unjust or militate against his conscience.”  Id. 
 22  Id. 
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demanding duties to the client, sets forth many more duties to the 
court itself.23  As Andrews notes summarizing developments in both the 
English and French contexts: “Truth and reasonable behavior were 
paramount duties from the very beginning of the profession in both 
cultures. . . .  Client concerns were often unstated, and when stated, 
the client duties, including zealous advocacy, were expressly 
subordinate to the lawyer’s duties to the court.”24  As the various legal 
oaths moved closer to the modern age, a similar emphasis continued.  
The 1816 oath from Geneva formed the basis for the Field Code and 
U.S. professional responsibility duties later on.  This oath concerned 
itself primarily with the justness of the litigation and the lawyer’s duties 
to the court, although as noted below, conceives of criminal defense as 
meriting something different.25 
Such a focus on the “just cause” of the action is clearly consistent 
with zealous advocacy where the cause is, in the lawyer’s reasonable 
view, “just”—of particular note here is that the lawyer’s view must be a 
reasonable one, and this mitigates against the fear that zeal is the last 
refuge of unscrupulous lawyers.  However, the litigation fairness 
approach also recognizes that zealous advocacy is likely to be the duty 
“most at odds with the lawyer’s duties to the court.”26  When imposed, 
these duties to the court “have been paramount over any conflicting 
client duties.”27 
This primacy of duties to the court marks a change from the 
earliest presentation of legal ethics in the Justinian Oath from the sixth 
century, where duties to the court were seen as tempering the primary 
duty of zealous advocacy.28  The Oath reads, in part, that 
[T]hey will undertake with all their power and strength, to 
carry out for their clients what they consider to be just and 
true, doing everything which it is possible for them to do.  
However, they, with their knowledge and skill, shall not 
prosecute a lawsuit with a bad conscience when they know 
that the case entrusted to them is dishonest or utterly 
hopeless or composed of false allegations.29 
 
 
 23  Id. at 396–97 (quoting 23 SACRORUM CONCILIORUM: NOVA ET AMPLISSIMA 
COLLECTIO, as translated in JOSIAH HENRY BENTON, THE LAWYER’S OFFICIAL OATH AND 
OFFICE 9 (1909). 
 24  Id. at 401. 
 25  Id. at 400. 
 26  Id. at 386. 
 27  Id. at 383. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Andrews, supra note 14, at 389 (quoting the Justinian code). 
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The Justinian Oath thus strikes a balance in favor of the client while 
recognizing the importance of lawyerly integrity, without which the 
system would be degraded by zeal.  The different balance struck by 
litigation fairness has less trust that zealousness (with integrity) would 
be to the benefit of the overall system. 
Litigation fairness does not necessarily proscribe all zealous 
advocacy, and certainly not in all instances.  For example, requiring 
reasonable behavior is, with very few exceptions, not inconsistent with 
zealous advocacy.  Nor is a zealous advocate likely to be overly 
conscribed by a duty to avoid offensiveness in treatment of judges and 
adversaries.  Likewise, zealous advocates may reasonably be convinced 
of the justness of their cause, and not simply be shilling for lying 
clients, meeting that notion of “proper motivation” that Andrews 
characterizes alongside just cause as part of duties to the court.30 
There are many times, however, where putting the needs of the 
system before the needs of the client makes the two models 
incompatible.  This is especially true in immigration court where the 
overburdened, under-resourced system would benefit greatly in terms 
of efficiency and caseload management if lawyers filed fewer motions, 
allowed the Government to meet its burden easily, consented to 
abbreviated client testimony to finish hearings more quickly, and so 
forth.  Zealous advocacy in such a setting does impose significant 
burdens on the tribunal itself, and all players in the system are surely 
aware of those burdens because years-long docket backlogs and under-
staffing of the immigration courts are widely noted phenomena,31 to 
the dismay of the Government and advocates alike.  Thus, immigration 
lawyers who choose to zealously advocate make a choice at odds with 
the needs of the system itself—an instance of litigation fairness 
clashing squarely with zealous advocacy. 
The litigation fairness model has been ascendant in American 
legal culture, and within the ethical literature.  Important voices such 
as William Simon have developed sophisticated arguments for the 
notion that all players in the adversarial system should define 
themselves as working toward justice in the system, instead of putting 
client interests first and foremost—although Simon recognizes that 
once a worthy client is chosen, a lawyer may advocate fully to achieve 
 
 30  Andrews, supra note 13 at 386. 
 31  See, e.g., Zoe Tilleman, Immigration Courts Backlog Grows as Obama Prepares 
Executive Action, NAT’L L. J. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com 
/id=1202677017577/Immigration-Courts-Backlog-Grows-as-Obama-Prepares-
Executive-Action#ixzz3RHYsDPNc. 
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justice.32  In this view, lawyers can discern what justice looks like from 
case to case, and matter to matter, and should commit to working 
toward that result. 
The litigation-fairness model also shows up in recent reforms to 
the Model Rules, state rules and contested understandings of the roles 
of lawyers in problem-solving courts.  Notice first the changes in the 
Model Rules themselves.  As Professor Anita Bernstein has written, the 
ABA’s 1980 Model Code of Professional Responsibility “omitted zeal 
from its enforceable rules, replacing the verb phrase ‘shall represent’ 
with ‘should represent’—its Canon 7 read ‘A Lawyer Should Represent 
a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law’ —thereby signaling 
mere guidance rather than a basis for discipline.”33  States have 
followed suit.  Arizona struck the phrase “zealous advocacy” from its 
rules of professional conduct in 2003: “Last December, the adverb 
‘zealously’ was removed and replaced with words demanding that 
lawyers ‘conduct themselves honorably.’  As the state bar put it, the 
change was made because ‘lawyers had misused’ zealous advocacy ‘to 
justify unprofessional, intemperate, and uncivil conduct while 
engaging in the practice of law.’”34  In 2004, the Colorado Bar 
Association President wrote to his membership that: “Diligence, 
competence, confidentially, with no conflicts of interest: elegant 
simplicity.  The rules are comprehensive, describing a lawyer’s duties 
not only to clients, but also to others.  In short, the word ‘zealous’ is 
not a word needed to describe a lawyer’s ethical duties.”35  In 2009, New 
York amended its rules, removing all references to zeal.36  In problem-
solving courts, as has been explored elsewhere in the literature, lawyers 
may be seen to have greater duties to the community and to abstract 
notions of justice than to the client,37 although some assert that the 
 
 32  Simon, supra note 17. 
 33  Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV 1165, 1167 (2006) (citation 
omitted). 
 34  Lincoln Caplan, The Good Advocate, LEGAL AFFAIRS (May/June 2004), 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2004/editorial_mayjun04.msp. 
 35  Steve C. Briggs, The Myth and Mischief of Zealous Advocacy, THE COLO. LAW. 
(2004), available at http://coloradomentoring.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
10/Briggs-S-The-Myth-and-Mischief-of-Zealous-Advocacy-34-The-Colorado-Lawyer-33-
2005.pdf. 
 36  Vilardo & Doyle, supra note 15, at 56. 
 37  For an interesting conversation about this debate, see John Feinblatt & Derek 
Denckla, What Does It Mean to be a Good Lawyer? Prosecutors, Defenders and Problem-Solving 
Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 206 (2001).  See also Tamar Meekins, Risky Business: Criminal 
Specialty Courts and the Ethical Obligations of the Zealous Criminal Defender, 12 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 75 (2007). 
KEYES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2015  9:27 PM 
488 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:475 
conflict in duties is overstated.38 
The diminution of zeal in the rules seems to reflect a conflation 
of zeal with incivility, rudeness and utterly unethical behavior—none 
of which is actually a problem of zeal.  Professor Bernstein defines zeal 
as “commitment to one side (rather than to a neutral search for truth), 
and passion.”39  She identifies the many flaws misattributed to zeal.40  
One example of such misattribution, using her definition of zeal, 
comes from a chapter devoted to “Excessive Zeal” in Richard Abel’s 
excellent LAWYERS IN THE DOCK, a rich set of case studies on unethical 
practices in a variety of settings.41  Abel highlights vivid examples of 
behaviors explicitly in violation of the Model Rules, including rude, 
personal attacks by lawyers, and falsification of evidence by lawyers.  All 
of the examples noted are problematic, but problematic on their own 
terms as rule violations, not as examples of zeal itself.42  One can be a 
passionate advocate committed to one side in a dispute without 
engaging in fraudulent, criminal, or hostile behavior.  As Professor 
Bernstein writes, “Lawyers who err deserve blame; zeal does not.”43 
In the immigration context, one appeal of litigation fairness is 
how it sweeps the rug from under the feet of lawyers who will falsify 
evidence or file anything for the sake of delaying a client’s case, who 
rely on an unreasonable zealousness (not the “reasonable” aspect of a 
just cause) to shill for clients.  Clearly these lawyers are unethical by 
any standard, but they try to hide their actions under the cloak of 
zealousness, and a different emphasis on duties to the court system 
would take that cloak from them.44  More significantly, a litigation 
fairness approach lives up to the neglected spirit of Matter of S-M-J-,45 a 
pivotal case in asylum jurisprudence that is the closest immigration law 
has come to articulating a collaborative approach in the immigration 
court system.  Notably, however, S-M-J- urged that the collaborative 
 
 38  Julie Goldman, The Need for Mental Health Courts for Lawyers to Fulfill Their Duties 
Under ABA Model Rule 1.14, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 683, 689–90 (2013); Ben 
Kempinen, Problem-Solving Courts and the Defense Function: The Wisconsin Experience, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 1349 (2011). 
 39  Bernstein, supra note 33, at 1171. 
 40  Id. at 1175–78. 
 41  RICHARD ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY 
PROCEEDINGS (2008), Chapters 7 and 8.  
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. at 1169. 
 44  Aristotle himself provides a simple response to this argument, noting that “[a] 
man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of [things that are most useful], 
and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.”  ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC (W. 
Rhys Roberts trans.), bk 1, ch. 1, sec. 13, at 3.   
 45  21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997). 
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spirit between judge, Government counsel and the immigrant/
immigrant’s attorney be to the benefit of the immigrant, not the system 
itself, in recognition of the tremendous consequences at stake.46  Such 
collaboration is sometimes present in pro se cases where judges or 
Government counsel will point out the immigrant’s potential eligibility 
for some form of relief, and urge the immigrant to find counsel who 
can help him or her apply for relief.  Once counsel enters an 
appearance for the immigrant, however, that notion of collaboration 
typically evaporates and the proceedings are often highly contested, 
with even judges playing an active role in adversarial questioning of the 
immigrant.47 With such adversariality comes the occasion for zealous 
advocacy. 
2. Zealous Advocacy 
Zealous advocacy draws from a longstanding tradition in legal 
ethics.  In 1908, the ABA discussed “the lawyer’s obligation to give 
‘entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the 
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of [the 
lawyer’s] utmost learning and ability.’”48  This was the “rhetorical 
apogee” of zealous advocacy, which has been more recently subsumed 
under the rule exhorting attorney diligence,49 with a separate mention 
in the preamble to the Model Rules.50  Nonetheless, it continues on as 
a popular ideal. 
In modern-day practice, the leading voices for zealous advocacy 
have been criminal defenders, with abundant scholarship providing 
justifications for that position.51  The criminal justice system provides a 
rich body of accumulated wisdom regarding zealous advocacy in the 
context of appointed counsel.52  The ethical norms of criminal 
 
 46  Id. at 727. 
 47  Maria Baldini-Potermin, Preparation of Testimony of Noncitizen and Other Lay 
Witnesses, IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK § 6:17 (2014). 
 48  MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 79 (2d ed. 
2002) (quoting ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 15 (1908)). 
 49  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (1983) (“A lawyer must also act 
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy 
upon the client’s behalf.  A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage 
that might be realized for a client.”). 
 50  “As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of 
the adversary system.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble, at ¶ 2 (2013). 
 51  FREEDMAN and SMITH, supra note 48; SMITH, infra note 55 
 52  The NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) has written extensively on this issue in 
the South.  The LDF noted that “[o]n the eve of Gideon’s 40th anniversary, these 
paper guarantees, however, are functionally meaningless in Mississippi, a state which 
provides almost no regulation, oversight, or funding for indigent defense.”  NAACP 
LDF, ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI’S INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (Feb. 2003), 
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defenders suggest that among the sometimes competing roles that 
lawyers play as advocates and officers of the court, the role as advocate 
is particularly important.  Indeed, the first of thirty-eight guidelines 
issued by the National Legal Aid and Defendant Association 
(“NLADA”) states that: “The paramount obligation of criminal defense 
counsel is to provide zealous and quality representation to their clients 
at all stages of the criminal process.  Attorneys also have an obligation 
to abide by ethical norms and act in accordance with the rules of the 
court.”53  David Luban shows how the power differential between the 
defendant and the opposing party—the State—demands heightened 
attention to the client, an argument set forth in more detail in the next 
section.  This Article will show that the same, and more, can be said of 
immigration proceedings. 
While the reality in criminal courts across the country is far from 
the ideal envisioned by Gideon,54 as described in Part III.A, infra, the 
zealous defender remains a dominant paradigm.  Freedman and 
Smith, criminal defense lawyers and scholars, have written extensively 
on the primacy of zealous advocacy in a defender’s practice, and Smith 
provides an eloquent summary of the philosophy: 
[A] lawyering paradigm in which zealous advocacy and the 
maintenance of client confidence and trust are paramount.  
Simply put, zeal and confidentiality trump most other rules, 
principles, or values.  When there is tension between these 
“fundamental principles” and other ethical rules, criminal 
defense lawyers must uphold the principles, even in the face 
of public or professional outcry. Although a defender must 
act within the bounds of the law, he or she should engage in 
advocacy that is as close to the line as possible, and, indeed, 
should test the line, if it is in the client’s interest in doing so.55 
Freedman and Smith have been among the most significant 
proponents of the importance of zealous advocacy for the practice of 
criminal defense, although they draw upon the longer tradition of 
zealous advocacy throughout the broader legal profession.56  Their 
 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/ 
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/ms_assemblylinejustice.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 53  NATIONAL LEGAL AID DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, 
available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Performance_ 
Guidelines#oneone (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (emphasis added) [hereinafter NLADA 
Standards]. 
 54  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 55  Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 89–91 (2003). 
 56  Lord Brougham famously described this principle in 1838 as follows:  
An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows, in the 
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arguments are grounded in the particular needs of criminal defense, 
given that in the criminal justice system, individuals are seeking 
protection from the full weight of the State—and given the stakes 
involved, where life and liberty are on the line.57  For them, “the central 
concern of a system of lawyers’ ethics is to strengthen and protect the 
role of the lawyer in enhancing individual dignity and autonomy 
through advocacy.”58  This view of zealous advocacy does more than 
defend the constitutional rights of the accused in any given case; it also 
promotes the broader societal goods of dignity and autonomy. 
With such strong historical antecedents, Smith and Freedman 
have not developed a new principle so much as justified the ongoing 
relevance and primacy of an old principle.  As any practitioner quickly 
realizes, rules of ethics often conflict with one another (even within 
one jurisdiction, let alone across jurisdictions), and the Freedman view 
is that in situations of conflict, the defender must resolve the conflict 
in favor of zealous advocacy for the client.59  Clinical legal scholars 
across many disciplines have also recognized zeal as a component of 
client-centered lawyering, the “predominant model for teaching 
lawyering skills” in American law schools (although problematically in 
tension with other values of client-centered lawyering).60 
3. Debate Over a Unitary Standard or a Context-Specific 
Standard of Practice 
Even among proponents of zealousness, extensive debate exists 
concerning the question of whether zealous advocacy is justified 
uniquely for criminal defense, justified for some broader subset of 
legal practice areas, or justified as a standard for all practice areas.  
While ultimately beyond the scope of this Article, this question is worth 
exploring briefly because this Article at a minimum assumes either that 
zealous advocacy is the right unitary standard or, at least, the necessary 
standard within the immigration-context. 
 
discharge of that office, but one person in the world, that client and 
none other.  To save that client by all expedient means—to protect that 
client at all hazards and costs to all others, and among others to 
himself—is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties; and he 
must not regard the alarm—the suffering—the torment—the 
destruction—which he may bring upon any other. 
1 SPEECHES OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM 105 (Edinburgh: A. & C. Black, 1838). 
 57  Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 133 (2008). 
 58  Smith, supra note 55, at 88.   
 59  Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 133 (2008). 
 60  Cruse, supra note 1, at 370. 
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At one end of the debate are Simon, discussed above, and Fred 
Zacharias, who advance the view that criminal defense is not 
particularly exceptional, and therefore should be governed by the 
same ethical norms as the rest of the legal profession—and not by 
norms of zealous advocacy.  Zacharias, whose scholarship focuses on 
prosecutorial ethics, has argued that the difference between civil 
litigants and criminal defendants is overblown, first because civil cases 
can have enormous impact on litigants, and second because 
incarceration is often brief and not terribly disruptive to the 
incarcerated.61  For these reasons, there is not enough of a difference 
between civil and criminal cases, in his view, to justify a different ethical 
standard.62 
Moving toward a justification for zealous advocacy in certain 
contexts is David Luban, a renowned philosopher and legal ethicist 
who has also taught in an immigration clinic and written of 
immigration’s difficult ethical challenges.63  Where Simon and 
Zacharias put forward a unitary theory of ethics that would not justify 
criminal defense exceptionalism,64 Luban provides a justification for 
treating criminal defense differently.65  Luban’s framework applies 
usefully for evaluating the world of immigration, and will therefore be 
discussed in greater detail below.  He particularly examines the 
question of who has the advantages in a criminal prosecution by 
looking at resources, procedural advantages, political and 
 
 61  Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Professional Responsibility, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 177–78 (1996).  Smith critiques this article:  
He goes so far as to assert that being arrested or incarcerated is no big 
deal to most “modern” defendants who “may meet incarcerated friends” 
at the local jail, thus, equating jail for the underclass to Starbucks for the 
coffee klatsch.  Zacharias concludes that, at the very least, “the assertion 
that criminal defendants are unique is a vast overgeneralization.” 
Smith, supra note 55, at 106–07. 
 62  Zacharias, supra note 61. 
 63  David Luban, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 31 (1995). 
 64  Simon does not believe the power of the State against the individual is a 
significant enough factor to justify criminal defense exceptionalism, at least partly 
because he is most concerned with lawyers hired by wealthy elites (think: OJ Simpson 
defense team) who may have almost limitless resources at their disposal.  In Simon’s 
view, such lawyers greatly overpower the “small number of harassed, overworked 
bureaucrats” who comprise the prosecution.  William Simon, The Ethics of Criminal 
Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1707 (1993).  Smith and Freedman have responded 
vigorously to his arguments, questioning, inter alia, whether his theory derives from 
the correct understanding of how criminal justice operates, and suggesting that his 
more collaborative approach to ethics ignores the reality of the power imbalances 
present in trial courts across the nation.  SMITH & FREEDMAN, supra note 48. 
 65  David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993). 
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psychological advantages, and bargaining power, and concludes that 
for the overwhelming majority of criminal prosecutions (and not 
including the high-price defense that preoccupies Simon), the state 
has far more power, which justifies a “rebuttable presumption” of 
zealous advocacy: the defender should assume that zealous advocacy is 
appropriate, unless something in the specific situation argues 
otherwise.66  He writes: 
[T]here are substantial objections to a double standard in 
legal ethics, including the obvious objection that 
practitioners may disagree about which standard applies to 
them.  In that case, my conclusion is that, if the standard is 
to be single, it should be the single standard of permitting 
aggressive defense in every case, rather than Simon’s single 
standard of presuming that aggressive defense is improper 
except when the threats of overpunishment, racism, or 
assembly line justice are imminent.  After all, since these are 
the most typical cases, the exception threatens in any event 
to swallow up the presumption.67 
A possible line between civil and criminal theories of ethics runs 
throughout legal history and ethics scholarship.68  Zealous advocacy is 
often treated as so innate to criminal defense that it needs no 
particular justification, and is just a distraction to the more 
complicated questions of zealousness in non-criminal law practice.69 
Abbe Smith has pushed back against the silo-ing of zeal to the 
world of criminal defense, arguing that zealous advocacy is the 
necessary, defining mode of lawyering across the profession—and not 
exceptional to criminal defense.70  Smith acknowledges how criminal 
defense is unique, but notes that there is simply no line that can be 
meaningfully drawn between it and the rest of the legal profession: 
 
 
 66  Id. at 1757–58. 
 67  Id. at 1766. 
 68  “Many of the core ideals are the same in both contexts, but a lawyer’s duties 
may vary depending on whether the litigation is civil or criminal.  In my discussion of 
the historical standards, I occasionally note the different context of criminal cases 
where that difference helped define the duty on the civil side.”  Andrews, supra note 
14, at 385.  The 1814 Swiss oath that otherwise falls squarely under the “litigation 
fairness” model, emphasizing both duties to the court and the justness of the cause, 
itself carved out an exception for criminal defense: “To not counsel or maintain any 
cause that I do not feel is just or equitable, as long as it does not refer to a criminal 
defense.”  Andrews, supra note 14, at 400. 
 69  See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decision-Making and the Design of Rules of 
Ethics, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 75 (2013) (“Of course, in criminal cases, the duty of zeal 
has an especially important place 
 70  Smith, supra note 55. 
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Although thoughtful scholars have proposed ethical schemes 
with two or more tiers, I believe this is a bad idea and 
ultimately a dangerous one.  Not only is it impossible to draw 
a principled line between criminal and civil practice, but it is 
impossible to draw tenable categorical lines at all.  There are 
also a host of practical difficulties in developing an ethical 
scheme that reflects all of the contexts of legal practice.  The 
danger is to the adversary system itself, and the constitutional 
principles underlying it.  The push to curb zealous 
representation in civil cases will inevitably jeopardize zealous 
representation in criminal cases and the rights of the 
accused.  As we have seen, the critique of “adversarial excess” 
invariably spills over into the criminal system.71 
The broader and deeper question of whether zealous advocacy 
should be the unitary standard for every form of law practice is beyond 
the scope of this Article.  In the following section, this Article does 
reject the notion that zealous advocacy is never justified.  By bringing 
the ethical standards of immigration practitioners in line with those of 
criminal defenders, this work could support Smith—because it shows 
how difficult it truly is to find a meaningful line between criminal and 
non-criminal work.72  It could also support Luban because he justifies 
zealous advocacy in certain criminal and quasi-criminal contexts,73 and 
the analysis below situates immigration practice squarely within the 
kind of “quasi-criminal” context he suggests. 
B. Justifying Zealous Advocacy for Immigration Practice 
Because part of the justification for zealous advocacy is the 
unevenness of the adversaries in multiple ways, the immigration 
system, too, needs to be evaluated as to that question.  Indeed, it 
compares in some regards quite easily to the criminal system, but also 
exceeds its lopsidedness in other regards.74  In an immigration 
proceeding, immigrants face the full power of the Government just as 
defendants in criminal trials do, but without even the minimal 
protections available in the criminal setting.  “A deportation 
proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in 
this country . . . .  Consistent with the civil nature of the proceeding, 
various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not 
 
 71  Id. at 137. 
 72  Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 89–91 (2003). 
 73  DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 31 (2007). 
 74  Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009); Ingrid V. 
Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282 (2013). 
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apply in a deportation hearing.”75  As in the criminal justice system, the 
stakes in immigration proceedings are extraordinarily high: the 
possible outcomes usually affect an individual’s ability to live with his 
or her family, to work, and to feel safe.  What is being litigated through 
the immigration laws, in the words of one commentator, strikes “not at 
the trappings of social, economic, or political advantage, but at the 
trappings of identity: home, family, community, and self, resulting in 
‘loss of both property and life; or all that makes life worth living.’”76  
Also as in the criminal system, much of the population in removal 
proceedings is incarcerated in detention facilities that are only 
nominally “civil” detention facilities.77 
These similarities to the criminal system, explored in more depth 
below, make it a useful exercise to examine how the justifications for 
zealous advocacy in the criminal context may justify zealous advocacy 
in immigration as well.  In his article, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 
Luban examines the question of who has the advantages in a criminal 
prosecution by looking at four factors: resources, procedural 
advantages, legitimacy, and bargaining power.  He concludes that for 
the overwhelming majority of criminal prosecutions, the State’s power 
far exceeds that of the defense.  For this reason, in most cases zealous 
advocacy will be appropriate and should be the default position of the 
defender.78  Applying Luban’s four factors in the immigration context, 
this Article finds a similarly robust justification for zealousness, making 
zealous advocacy the appropriate default principle in immigration 
proceedings as well.  Indeed, as Professor Susan Carle has pointed out, 
the “extreme case” where Luban sees a need for moving toward the 
ethical edges is actually not the extreme for lawyers who routinely 
 
 75  INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). 
 76  Susan Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold, 50 ARK. L. REV. 269, 270 (1997) 
(quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)). 
 77  The harshness of immigration detention, though nominally civil in nature, is 
well known.  See generally DR. DORA SCHRIRO, DHS IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT: IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2009), 
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-
rpt.pdf (noting how immigration detention facilities resemble criminal facilities, and 
how ICE officials are not experts in the delivery of services needed to run such 
facilities).  For typical accounts of such facilities, see Edwidge Danticat, Detained 
Immigrants Deserve Humane Treatment, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2013), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/edwidge-danticat-wasting-money-lives-through-
the-detention-of-immigrants/2013/03/14/3d3e08c4-8b70-11e2-b63f-f53fb9f2fcb4 
_story.html; Azadeh N. Shahshahni, The Reality of Life Inside Immigration Detention, 
ACLU BLOG (Nov. 20, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights-racial-
justice/reality-life-inside-immigration-detention. 
 78  Luban, supra note 67. 
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practice in such areas.79 
1. Resources 
The relative power of the state and the immigrant in immigration 
removal cases largely shares the power dynamic found in criminal 
proceedings.  The Migration Policy Institute determined that the 
United States Government spends more on immigration enforcement 
than all other law enforcement activities combined.80  Much of this 
spending is concentrated in border enforcement, including speedy, 
mass-trials brought by federal prosecutors for recent border-crossers, 
and the spending has not benefited the kind of litigation at the heart 
of this Article—litigation in immigration courts in the country’s 
interior.81 
Although the Office of Principal Legal Advisor within the Bureau 
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which houses the 
ICE prosecutors, has not benefited from these budget increases, ICE 
still possesses relative advantages in most of the cases in immigration 
court.  First, ICE has access to the individual’s entire immigration and 
criminal history, much of which may not end up being shared with the 
applicant.  ICE has notes from Customs and Border Patrol, which 
could include interviews done at the border, or from USCIS, which 
would include asylum interviews notes if the immigrant filed for asylum 
affirmatively.82  Under a recent court order, ICE must now provide 
these notes if the applicant submits a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request. ICE has no affirmative duty to turn over the notes to 
counsel or to the applicant, and one scholar suggests this will leave 
 
 79  Susan Carle, Structure and Integrity, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1311, 1319–20 (2008) 
(asserting that Luban as starting to use a dividing line centered around clients with 
power and clients without power). 
 80  Doris Meissner, et. al., Donald M. Kerwin, Muzaffar Christi, and & Claire 
Bergeron, Immigration Enforcement in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Jan. 
2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf.  
 81  The President’s Fiscal Year 2015 Budget: Department of Homeland Security, 
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM (Mar. 11, 2014), http://immigrationforum.org/ 
blog/the-presidents-fiscal-year-2015-budget-department-of-homeland-security/ 
(showing that the Office of Principal Legal Advisor prosecuting cases in court had a 
budget of roughly $204.5 million in 2014, out of an enforcement budget of 
approximately $5.6 billion) (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).  Note that for FY2016, ICE is 
seeking a budget increase to fund approximately 300 more attorney positions.  Dibya 
Sarkar, The President’s 2016 Budget Request: Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FIERCE 
HOMELAND SECURITY (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/ 
story/presidents-2016-budget-request-immigration-and-customs-enforcement/2015-
02-05. 
 82  Maria Baldini-Potermin, IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK, § 3:12. FOIA requests 
to the EOIR and DHS. 
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many out from receiving these crucial notes as a result.83  Second, ICE 
prosecutors typically hear all their scheduling matters in one 
consolidated session in front of one judge, while an individual attorney 
may have matters on multiple days of the week, requiring hours to be 
spent in court simply awaiting a ten minute status hearing.84  Third, 
ICE has the capability of investigating documents, courtesy of the 
Homeland Security Investigations Forensic Document Laboratory 
(“FDL”).85  The FDL has “[m]ore than 60 specially trained staff 
members [who] have access to a library and databases of identity and 
travel documents from across the world and the latest technology to 
identify inconsistencies.”86  By contrast, an immigrant can attest to the 
validity of a passport or birth certificate or political membership card 
introduced into evidence, but cannot usually independently provide 
proof of authentication.  Although that may be sufficient to meet their 
burden of authentication,87 it hardly carries the same level of weight as 
documentation submitted to the FDL. 
In the specific realm of asylum litigation, the balance of 
investigatory resources is more sharply tilted toward the Government, 
for the simple reason that as a matter of safety, asylum-seekers often 
fear obtaining evidence from the persecuting country,88 and may fear 
 
 83  E-mail from Professor Phil Schrag, one of the authors of the influential REFUGEE 
ROULETTE, to the CAIR Coalition (Nov. 22, 2013) (on file with author): 
By its literal terms, the consent agreement only applies to officers 
handling FOIA requests.  That will help referred asylum applicants who 
have representatives many months before their hearings.  But it won’t 
help the many others—with no representatives, with incompetent 
representatives who don’t file FOIA requests, or who retain 
representatives within a few months before their court hearings—
because they will never get the notes in time. 
 84  Although not a procedural advantage, the extent of this face time also raises a 
“repeat player” issue that may provide ICE with a distinct advantage over the 
immigrant’s attorney.  Some immigration attorneys are frequently enough at court to 
be considered repeat players but none has the extensive time logged in front of 
particular judges that ICE counsel would.  This may, of course, work to the 
disadvantage of an ICE attorney if that attorney has established a bad reputation with 
a particular judge.  
 85  Homeland Security Investigations Forensic Laboratory, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/hsi-fl/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
 86  TOP STORY: ICE’s Forensic Document Lab Serves as Authentication Authority, 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Aug. 15, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/ 
news/releases/1108/110815washingtondc.htm. 
 87  Documents may be considered authentic where they are inherently reliable.  
Matter of Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609 (B.I.A. 1988). 
 88  One attorney known to the author used to seek authentication until a client’s 
sister was killed in Burundi in the attempt to authenticate a document.  The difficulties 
of seeking such authentication were examined—and found plausible—by the Fourth 
Circuit in a case about discretion in asylum proceedings.  Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 
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any action—like authentication, or contacting witnesses—that might 
alert the persecuting government to the fact that the individual is 
seeking asylum.  The availability of the Homeland Security 
Investigations Forensic Document Laboratory is an extra advantage in 
this delicate setting.  More profoundly, as will be discussed below 
under procedural advantages, the evidentiary imbalance is aggravated 
by the burden on the applicant to provide all corroborating evidence 
that would be reasonable to obtain, while the Government can win its 
case without producing any evidence whatsoever—simply by finding 
discrepancies in the asylum-seeker’s statements.89  The demands on the 
Government are simply smaller than the demands on the applicant, 
which means that far more resources must go into preparing an 
asylum-seeker’s case than would go into opposing it.90 
2. Procedural advantages 
When considering procedures, it is clear that here the advantages 
available to the Government greatly outweigh—and perhaps 
completely obliterate—those available to immigration lawyers, in 
numerous ways.  This section examines how constitutional infirmities 
in immigration law advantage the Government, and how the posture 
of immigration cases (where the immigrant is seeking a benefit from 
the State) disadvantages the immigrant. 
a. Constitutional infirmities in immigration law 
One set of constitutional infirmities in immigration law arises 
from the plenary power doctrine, which permits the political branches 
of government to create and administer immigration policy largely 
free of constitutional scrutiny.91  While the criminal system has a host 
of constitutional protections (even if many are weakly implemented), 
 
504, 508–09 (2008). 
 89  See Part II.B.2(b), infra.  
 90  Private immigration attorneys practicing in the area of removal defense earn 
approximately $63,000 as a median salary (compared to $100,000 for their colleagues 
who do business immigration, and work approximately 50 hours per week (the median 
weekly hours)).  AILA Marketplace Study, at 44, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS 
ASSOCIATION (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer. 
aspx?docid=36823&linkid=245426.  Fifty-two percent say they have all the work they 
can handle and another 21 percent have more than they can handle.  Id. at 36.  By 
comparison, a position posted in 2014 for an ICE attorneys opening listed a salary of 
$106,263–$157,100. See USAJOBS, Job Announcement, https://www.usajobs.gov/ 
GetJob/PrintPreview/385875000# (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (job announcement on 
file with author). 
 91  See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). 
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immigration courts are required only to be “fundamentally fair” under 
the Fifth Amendment.92 
The fundamental fairness standard, governed by the Mathews v. 
Eldridge93 balancing test, allows immigrants to have interpreters,94 and 
to present evidence—such as hearsay evidence—that would not be 
admissible in federal proceedings.95  The standard, however, also 
permits numerous practices that work against the immigrants, and 
does not apply in a large number of areas that could be considered 
part of fairness, such as having an attorney at all.  Consider just four of 
these practices.  First, under the “fundamental fairness” standard, an 
individual need not be physically present for their hearing.96  Detained 
immigrants need to be present only by video for their removal 
hearings, because transporting them from detention facilities would, 
it is argued, be cost-prohibitive for the Government.97  Second, in 
immigration proceedings, a mentally incompetent individual’s case 
can go forward so long as the proceeding is simply “fair,” although 
courts have recognized that this likely means the appointment of 
counsel.98  By contrast, in the criminal setting, cases cannot go forward 
at all where the defendant is not mentally competent.99  Third, the 
 
 92  Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation 
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH & LEE L. REV. 469, 515–16 (2007). 
 93  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 94  Niarchos v. INS, 393 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1968) (“We think that the absence 
of an interpreter at the 1962 hearing is contrary to the aim of our law to provide 
fundamental fairness in administrative proceedings.”).  Notions of fairness clearly shift 
over time, as the current standard providing for interpreters is based upon 
fundamental fairness, as was a seminal case reaching the opposite result in 1891.  
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (finding that lack of an 
interpreter for a Japanese woman did not violate due process). 
 95  Matter of Grijalva, 19 I. & N. Dec. 713 (B.I.A. 1988) (hearsay evidence permitted 
unless its use would be fundamentally unfair). 
 96  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2006) (“If it is impracticable by reason of an alien’s 
mental incompetency for the alien to be present at the proceeding, the Attorney 
General shall prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and privileges of the alien.”). 
 97  This practice could be litigated, as the balancing test has strong compelling 
factors on the immigrant’s side as well.  However, as a practical matter, an interlocutory 
appeal on such a pre-trial issue would be made unlikely by the fact of the immigrant’s 
detention, as a delay of even two or three months and continued detention while the 
matter was pending before the BIA, would considerably deter most immigrants from 
filing the appeal. 
 98  Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011). 
 99  Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Detention of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. 
L. REV. 832, 834 (1960) (“The competency rule did not evolve from philosophical 
notions of punishability, but rather has deep roots in the common law as a by-product 
of the ban against trials in absentia; the mentally incompetent defendant, though 
physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend 
himself.”)  Id. at 834. 
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right to be represented at the immigrant’s own expense is available 
only as a statutory matter, not from a constitutional right.100  Although 
decades of immigration decisions recognized that the immigrants can 
expect their counsel to be effective (under the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause),101 that right applies only if they have counsel, and there 
is no right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment for immigration 
proceedings.102  Furthermore, the recent Compean decision, later 
vacated by the Attorney General, found that there was no Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel, and therefore no right to effective 
counsel.103  Although vacated, the issue is not settled—the Attorney 
General asked EOIR to develop a rule on the subject when he vacated 
Compean, and EOIR has not yet done so.104 
Whether or not immigrants with counsel are entitled to effective 
counsel, what is yet more significant is that immigrants largely have no 
constitutional right to counsel in the first place.  As long established, 
removal proceedings are not punishment, no matter how serious a 
consequence deportation may be.  As the Court noted in Padilla, “We 
have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe ‘penalty’; 
 
 100  INA § 240(b)(4)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2013). 
 101  For example, in Matter of Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553, 558 (B.I.A. 2003) 
(citations omitted), the court stated: 
[S]ince Matter of Lozada was decided 15 years ago, the circuit courts have 
consistently continued to recognize that . . . [an alien] has a Fifth 
Amendment due process right to a fair immigration hearing and may be 
denied that right if counsel prevents the respondent from meaningfully 
presenting his or her case. 
Id.  Matter of Lozada requires that individuals file a complaint with the attorney’s bar 
and if able to demonstrate prejudice, they may have their cases reopened or reviewed.  
It is unclear how much of a deterrent this system is to immigration practitioners.   
 102  Trench v. INS, 783 F.2d 181, 183 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961 
(1986).  See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and 
Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1775–80 (2010). 
 103  Matter of Compean, 24 I & N. Dec. 710 (B.I.A. 2009).  The Ninth Circuit has 
found that fundamental fairness does matter, looking at “whether the proceeding is 
so fundamentally unfair that the alien is prevented from reasonably presenting her 
case,” and requiring the individual to demonstrate prejudice, a high bar to meet.  
Torres-Chavez v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Lara-Torres v. 
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 2004), amended sub nom. Lara-Torres v. Gonzales, 
404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2005)).  Steven Legomsky has thoughtfully explored how this 
leaves adjudicators unconstrained in assessing effectiveness, and potentially subject to 
severe new limitations by Congress, and crafted an approach to require greater 
constitutional protections for immigrants post-Padilla.  Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Transporting Padilla to Deportation Proceedings: A Due Process Right to the Effectiveness of 
Counsel, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 43, 47 (2011). 
 104  Attorney General Vacates Compean Order, Initiates New Rulemaking to Govern 
Immigration Removal Proceedings, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 3, 2009), http:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-vacates-compean-order-initiates-new-
rulemaking-govern-immigration-removal. 
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but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.”105  In these non-
criminal proceedings, immigrants are not generally entitled to 
appointed counsel.106  This sets in motion, as Professor Noferi has 
termed it, “cascading constitutional deprivations” for the immigrant.107 
Another right available to criminal defendants that is not available 
to immigrants is that of Brady disclosures.108  Brady entitles defendants 
to see the evidence against them, including potentially exculpatory 
evidence.109  In immigration court, pre-trial discovery is nominally 
available as a regulatory matter, but in practice does not exist.110  ICE 
prosecutors have routinely refused requests to see the immigrant’s “A 
file,” or immigration file; the Ninth Circuit held in 2013 that the 
immigrant had a right to the file,111 but other circuits have not yet 
followed suit.  A recent lawsuit has improved the availability of notes 
from asylum interviews, but such notes must be requested through 
FOIA and not automatically turned over by the Government.  Since 
the credibility of the immigrant in court is always important, and in 
asylum cases particularly critical, this inability to see the file and 
discover potential discrepancies before trial matters profoundly.  
Where discrepancies are probable (traumatized individuals testifying 
about events that may have occurred years in the past)112 and 
determinative (an adverse credibility finding jeopardizes asylum 
cases), immigrants are at a significant procedural disadvantage not 
being able to examine their file before a hearing. 
Another constitutional infirmity is the reach of I.N.S. v. Lopez-
Mendoza,113 the case that limited the “fruit of the poisonous tree” 
doctrine in immigration proceedings.  In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court 
 
 105  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)). 
 106  As noted above, this is being incrementally addressed through appointment of 
counsel for specific sub-groups of immigrants. 
 107  Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel 
for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
63, 81 (2012). 
 108  The landmark Brady v. Maryland case found a due process violation where the 
prosecution did not turn over potentially exculpatory evidence to defense.  373 U.S. 
83 (1963). 
 109  Id. 
 110  Geoffrey Heeren, Shaking the One-Way Mirror: Discovery in Immigration Court, 79 
BROOK. L. REV. 1569 (2014). 
 111  Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 373–74 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (noting 
that the immigrant has a right to a “full and fair hearing in a deportation proceeding” 
under the Fifth Amendment, and holding that denying him access to his immigration 
file (“alien file”) constituted a violation of this constitutional right). 
 112  Ilunga v. Holder, No. 13-2064, 2015 WL 332110 (4th Cir. Jan. 27, 2015). 
 113  468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
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held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
could nonetheless be admissible in immigration court, absent 
“particularly egregious” Fourth Amendment violations, because 
immigration proceedings are “purely” civil actions where criminal 
protections need not apply.114  Immigration practitioners still 
sometimes seek to suppress illegally obtained evidence, and 
occasionally succeed, but judges are hesitant to engage in Fourth 
Amendment litigation in their administrative tribunals, and 
practitioners face pressure from both their adversary (ICE) and the 
judge him or herself to refrain from raising these issues. 
Likewise, secret evidence has been permitted in immigration 
court for decades.  In Knauff v. Shaughnessy, a case which arose in the 
context of national security concerns during the Second World War, 
the Government permitted the exclusion of Ellen Knauff on the basis 
of secret evidence.115  INA §240(b)(4)(B) also permits the Government 
to rely upon secret evidence in the removal context.116  Secret evidence 
clearly inhibits immigrants’ ability to defend themselves because they 
will typically only receive a summary of the evidence, making it difficult 
to contest its accuracy, challenge its sources, and so forth.117 
b. Posture of immigration cases 
A critical source of difference between the criminal and 
immigration court settings arises from the different posture of 
immigration cases.  In criminal cases, the defendant is seeking 
protection from the State.  In immigration cases, the immigrant is 
seeking protection from the State’s desire to remove him or her, and 
the State initially has the burden to prove removability.118  This is a 
burden that the State is seldom required to prove.  Even when 
contested, which happens seldom, the standard of proof for the State 
is lower than in the criminal context, which may help explain the 
number of U.S. citizens who end up being deported despite their 
protestations that they are, indeed, citizens.119 
 
 114  Id. at 1050. 
 115  U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
 116  INA § 240(b)(4)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3)(iv) (2013).  See also INA § 
504(e)(1)(A) (creating Alien Terrorist Removal Courts where secret evidence may be 
used).  But see Jaya Ramji-Nogales, A Global Approach to Secret Evidence: How Human Rights 
Law Can Reform Our Immigration System, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 301–02 
(noting that this provision has never yet been invoked). 
 117  Niels W. Frenzen, National Security and Procedural Fairness: Secret Evidence and the 
Immigration Laws, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASE 45 (1999). 
 118  INA § 240(c)(3). 
 119  William Finnegan, The Deportation Machine, NEW YORKER (Apr. 29, 2013); Ted 
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Once the State meets this initial burden, usually with the 
immigrant conceding removability at a master calendar hearing, the 
burden shifts to the immigrant to establish a right to remain and this 
generally means that the immigrant must request a benefit from the 
State, instead of seeking enforcement of a right.120  This basic tenet of 
immigration law creates countless procedural disadvantages and 
ethical dilemmas for the immigration practitioner, some of which are 
examined in more detail in Part B, infra.  At root, because the 
immigrant is affirmatively seeking a benefit, almost anything the 
Government may require to show eligibility for that benefit must be 
given—if the requirement is too onerous, the individual can simply 
choose not to apply for the benefit.121 
Finally, simply in terms of the task set for each side, the 
procedural posture means that the task is vastly more difficult and 
resource-intensive for the immigrant’s attorney than for the 
Government.  First, the attorney must establish every element of 
eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence, which means the 
Government need simply disprove one element.122  Second, in asylum 
cases in particular, the attorney must provide corroborating evidence 
of the asylum claim where reasonable to expect that such evidence is 
available, despite the relative unlikelihood of someone fleeing 
persecution with corroborating documents.123  By contrast, the 
Government can win its case merely by finding inconsistencies in the 
applicant’s testimony, usually via cross-examination and sometimes by 
introducing notes from initial asylum interviews conducted months, if 
not years, before the final hearing.124  For reasons well explored 
 
Robbins, In the Rush to Deport, Expelling U.S. Citizens, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 24, 2011).  
See also DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN 
DIASPORA 14–15 (2012). 
 120  INA § 240(c)(2). 
 121  Similar issues abound in welfare law, such as requirements that candidates 
undergo drug testing before receiving welfare benefits, although some of these laws 
are being struck down as unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Lebron v. Wilkins, 990 F. Supp. 2d 
1280 (M.D. Fla. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Lebron v. Sec’y of Florida Dep’t of Children & 
Families, No. 14-10322, 2014 WL 6782734 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2014). 
 122  INA § 240(c)(4). 
 123  “In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the 
barest necessities and very frequently even without personal documents.”  UNHCR, 
UNHCR HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 
UNDER THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS 
OF REFUGEES 196, available at http://archive.hrea.org/learn/tutorials/refugees/ 
Handbook/partii.htm (last visited Feb. 28. 2015). 
 124  The Fourth Circuit recently acknowledged this unfairness powerfully in Ilunga 
v. Holder, No. 13-2064, 2015 WL 332110 (4th Cir. Jan. 27, 2015), but advocates still 
must contend with the REAL ID’s definition of credibility, which includes consistency.  
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elsewhere, even asylum-seekers with truthful, unembellished claims 
may be inconsistent, creating another challenge for their lawyers to 
overcome. 
3. Legitimacy 
This aspect of Luban’s justification for zealous advocacy in the 
criminal context is the most weakly applied to the immigration 
context, but has resonance here, too.  Writing about jury impressions 
of the State’s criminal case, he notes the narrative and normative 
power that the State has in pursuing a case against a defendant, as 
juries will think “where there’s smoke, there’s fire.”125  The 
Government’s reliance on police officers as witnesses, too, taps into 
powerful perceptions about law enforcement reliability, and who 
constitute the “good guys” in a particular case.  The jurors’ faith that a 
case brought by the State is credible because the State itself is 
“democratic and legitimate” also strengthens the State’s hand at trial, 
in his view. 
Immigration hearings are bench trials, so if this factor of 
legitimacy resonates in the immigration context, it is through the 
susceptibility of judges to those narrative dynamics.126  Those dynamics 
may, indeed, be powerful, as I have explored in other scholarship.127  
The dynamics emerge through such phenomena such as the 
availability heuristic (the mental shortcut filling in dispositive 
information when the fact-finder has a litany of available stories, often 
from popular media, that help make sense of the case in front of him 
or her) or cognitive dissonance (the difficulty of reconciling new 
information with previously understood information or, even more 
powerfully, previously made decisions).128  But while legitimacy aspect 
may be a factor, it is likely less of a factor here than in the criminal jury-
trial context, where most judges are also keenly aware of their duty to 
rule impartially—a factor that may help diminish the biases and 
heuristics noted above, at least as compared to juries. 
 
 
See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat. 231; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West 
2015). 
 125  Luban, supra note 65 at 1741.  
 126  See generally Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for 
New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207 (2012). 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. 
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4.  Bargaining power 
Luban posits that the weak bargaining power of criminal 
defendants can justify zealous advocacy, because such advocacy may be 
the only true bargaining chip that a criminal defender has.129  The same 
can be said for immigration attorneys.  Many immigrants are in 
removal proceedings because of some prior contact with the criminal 
justice system.130  The conflation of the immigration and criminal 
systems, and the consequences to immigrants’ removability, have been 
well studied in both criminal and immigration scholarship.131  An 
immigrant’s bargaining power within immigration has often been 
eliminated at that stage of proceedings, where he or she accepted a 
guilty plea that rendered him or her deportable, yielding to complex 
pressures that have been well documented elsewhere.132 
Within the immigration system itself, bargaining power is 
extremely limited.  Other scholars have noted, correctly, that this stems 
from the binary nature of removal proceedings, where the outcomes 
are either removal or admission.133  What little opportunity exists for 
negotiation focuses on two specific avenues: seeking prosecutorial 
discretion to administratively close or terminate a case (or stay removal 
if ordered removed) or by requesting voluntary departure in lieu of a 
removal order.134  As described here, the immigrant has extraordinarily 
 
 129  Luban, supra note 65 at 1747 (“In the criminal defense context, by contrast, it 
seems intuitively correct to me that the prospect of aggressive defense can indeed 
function to take away the prosecutor’s built-in bargaining advantage . . . and it seems 
plain that prosecutors have little incentive to bargain fairly unless defenders 
reestablish the balance of bargaining power.”) 
 130  See Jason A. Cade, The Plea Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751 (2013). 
 131  Jason A. Cade and Jenny Roberts have explored this intersection from the 
criminal justice perspective.  See Jason A. Cade, The Plea Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in 
Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751 (2013); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors 
Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 
(2011).  Many have explored this intersection on the immigration side, since the early 
work of Juliet Stumpf and Jennifer Chacón.  See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: 
Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1831 
(2007); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). 
 132  Cade, supra note 131; Roberts, supra note 131. 
 133  See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009) 
(calling for proportionate immigration sanctions in lieu of the one currently available 
sanction, deportation); Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 341, 393 (2008) (“[T]here is little bargaining in modern deportation 
proceedings, relative to the bargaining that occurs in the criminal justice system, 
because deportation is a largely binary rather than graduated sanction.”). 
 134  A third, specific to the asylum context, concerns offers by the government to 
stipulate to withholding of removal (a higher evidentiary burden, but a lesser form of 
KEYES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2015  9:27 PM 
506 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:475 
little bargaining power in requests for prosecutorial discretion, and the 
more effective requests for voluntary departure actually yield little by 
way of benefit to the immigrant—thus, they are bargains easily given 
by the Government and not reflective of a diminished governmental 
bargaining power. 
One of the broadest means available to securing relief from 
removal is the favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but as the 
name implies, it is relief that is solely determined by the prosecutor 
himself.  Although having a long history in the immigration context,135  
prosecutorial discretion came to prominence among immigration 
practitioners with the release of two memos by ICE Director John 
Morton in the summer of 2011.136  These two memos were followed by 
an announcement that the new agency vision would be implemented 
in conjunction with the Department of Justice through an 
individualized review of existing cases to permit closure or other 
discretionary actions for those deemed to be low priorities.137  Then-
Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano explained the 
administration’s policy in a speech given on October 5, 2011, 
emphasizing that the Administration’s stated focus had been clearing 
immigration courts’ dockets so that priority could be given to the 
“identification and removal of public safety and national security 
threats.”138 
Despite the attention given to it, however, and despite the breadth 
permitted by the Morton Memos, actual favorable exercises of 
discretion have been extremely limited.  There is little cost to the 
 
relief) in lieu of litigating and risking an adverse decision from the judge.  The 
difficulties associated with this particular bargaining position merit far more detailed 
consideration than this Article can afford. 
 135  See generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action and the 
DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. 59 (2013). 
 136  The first memo concerned civil immigration priorities generally.  MEMORANDUM 
FROM JOHN MORTON ON EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION CONSISTENT WITH THE 
CIVIL IMMIGRATION PRIORITIES OF THE AGENCY FOR THE APPREHENSION, DETENTION, AND 
REMOVAL OF ALIENS (June 17, 2011), www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/ 
prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.  The second concerned discretion for particular 
victims, witnesses and plaintiffs. MEMORANDUM FROM JOHN MORTON ON PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION REGARDING CERTAIN VICTIMS, WITNESSES AND PLAINTIFFS (June 17, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/ domestic-violence.pdf. 
 137  Letter from Janet Napolitano to Senator Dick Durbin (Aug. 18, 2011), available 
at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Prosecutorial 
%20Discretion_Napolitano%20Durbin%20letter%208-18-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 
2015).  
 138  DHS, Press Release, Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks on Smart Effective Border Security 
and Immigration Enforcement, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 5, 2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/20111005-napolitano-remarks-border-strategy-
and-immigration-enforcement.shtm. 
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Government for denying a prosecutorial discretion request, especially 
where the prosecutor could point to any negative equity.  Although 
there are supposed to be systemic advantages to granting the requests 
where the applicant meets enough of the prosecutorial discretion 
factors, there is little advantage to the prosecutor in any particular case.  
The prosecutor bears the risk of being the name associated with a 
decision not to remove someone who later proved dangerous, either 
in terms of national security or crimes—and while that risk may be 
small, the impact would be strongly negative if it did happen.  With the 
outcomes in the hands of the prosecutors, and incentives skewed 
toward denying requests, it is unsurprising that the rate of favorable 
prosecutorial discretion decisions remains low.  The latest data, from 
December 2014, showed that only 6.6 percent of cases before the 
immigration courts were closed through an exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.139  An earlier report indicated that 95 percent of those 
granted prosecutorial discretion were represented by attorneys, so 
even with advocates, the vast majority of immigrants were unable to 
bargain for the desired result of administrative closure or termination 
of their cases.140 
The second form of negotiation that happens in immigration 
court, voluntary departure, is the reverse of prosecutorial discretion in 
terms of incentives and availability.  Voluntary departure is designated 
by statute to permit certain immigrants to avoid the ten-year bar 
associated with an immigration court removal order and “voluntarily 
depart” the country at their own expense.141  Voluntary departure 
meets multiple government objectives: removing the unlawful 
immigrant, avoiding litigation, and saving the money it would take to 
litigate and enforce an order, as well as to actually transport the 
immigrant to the home country.142  Absent any of the statutory bars to 
voluntary departure, such as certain criminal convictions,143 ICE 
prosecutors routinely agree to requests for voluntary departure. 
 
 
 139  TRAC Immigration, Immigration Court Cases Closed Based on Prosecutorial 
Discretion, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/prosdiscretion/compbacklog_latest.html 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
 140  TRAC Immigration, ICE Prosecutorial Discretion Program (June 28, 2012), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/287/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
 141  INA § 240B (2013). 
 142  Ballenilla-Gonzalez v. INS, 546 F.2d 515, 521 (2d Cir. 1976) (“The purpose of 
authorizing voluntary departure in lieu of deportation is to effect the alien’s prompt 
departure without further trouble to the Service.  Both the aliens and the Service 
benefit thereby.”). 
 143  Aggravated felonies disqualify immigrants from seeking voluntary departure.  
INA § 240B(a)(1). 
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Although this might seem to be an area where the immigrant has 
great bargaining power, the fact is that the benefit to the immigrant is 
usually negligible—if there is any benefit at all.  Immigrants who have 
accrued a year or more of unlawful presence in the United States are 
subject to a ten-year bar whether they leave the country with an 
immigration court removal order, through voluntary departure, or 
simply by self-deportation.144  Many of those in immigration removal 
proceedings have this ten-year bar already, in one of two ways.  Either 
they were picked up after having been in the country a year or more, 
or for more recent arrivals, their continued accrual of unlawful 
presence while awaiting their hearing pushes them past the all-
important year mark.  The Government therefore loses nothing, gains 
the same ten-year bar on the individual returning, and avoids 
litigation.  Moreover, the immigrant leaves at his or her own expense—
a specific cost, although one that is perhaps compensated for by the 
dignitary value of not being deported.  To the extent the immigrant is 
bargaining, it is for something of considerable benefit to the 
Government, hardly a robust example of bargaining power. 
Moreover, detention casts a shadow over any bargaining 
processes.  Detained immigrants comprised 36 percent of immigration 
court cases, or roughly 100,000 people, completed in FY2012.145  Of 
these 100,000 cases, some were detained because they were subject to 
the mandatory detention provision of the INA, which covers almost all 
drug offenses, as well as many theft convictions, violent crimes, and 
others.146  Others are detained simply because the government sees 
them as a flight risk and/or a danger to public safety, or because they 
are unable to pay bond, if bond was set.147  In either situation, very 
difficult detention conditions148 create a strong incentive to agree to 
any option that will end the detention quickly and provide a strong 
 
 144  INA 212 (a)(9)(B)(i)(II). 
 145  FY 2012 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FY 2012, at O1, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 2013, 
revised Mar. 2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf [hereinafter 
EOIR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]. 
 146  INA § 236(c). 
 147  Discretionary detention is authorized by INA § 236(a), and its parameters are 
fleshed out in Matter of Patel, 15 I&N Dec. 666 (B.I.A. 1976). 
 148  See, e.g., Robert Morgenthau, Immigrants Jailed Just to Hit a Number, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Jan 19, 2014), available at http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/immigrants-
jailed-hit-number-article-1.1583488; Ian Urbina and Catherine Rentz, Immigrants Held 
in Solitary Cells, Often for Weeks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/03/24/us/immigrants-held-in-solitary-cells-often-for-weeks.html?pagewanted 
=all&_r=0; Nina Bernstein, Officials Hid Truths of Immigrant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 9, 2010), available at  http://www.nytimes.com/ 2010/01/10/us/10detain 
.html?ref=incustodydeaths. 
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disincentive to exercising rights of appeal, which can stretch a period 
of detention out for months longer.  Moreover, some immigrants are 
unlikely to be ultimately removed because they are from a country 
where, for example, there is ongoing strife, and these individuals 
become eligible for post-order release (usually with intensive 
monitoring and/or an ankle bracelet) 180 days after an 
administratively final order.149  An appeal would delay their possibility 
of release on that basis as well, as it would delay the existence of an 
administratively final order.  Finally, detainees have great difficulty 
securing representation for possible appeals, often because of the 
increased cost of access to detention facilities by lawyers (distance and 
bureaucratic obstacles, as well as higher costs for hiring experts who 
might be needed in the case).150 
These dramatic limitations on the existence of immigrants’ 
bargaining power justify zealous advocacy.  As Luban writes in the 
criminal context, “[t]he credible threat of an aggressive defense that 
will not necessarily lead to acquittal—remember that only 1% of state 
felony prosecutions end in acquittal—may provide a bargaining chip 
sufficient to persuade an otherwise recalcitrant prosecutor to bargain 
in good faith.”151  In immigration, knowing that a case will be fiercely 
litigated may be sufficient to have the Government attorney take a 
closer look at whether, indeed, this case could benefit from 
prosecutorial discretion instead of litigation.  While Government 
attorneys have not fully availed of prosecutorial discretion in line with 
the Morton memos,152 the prospect of vigorous litigation, instead of the 
likelihood of accepting voluntary departure or facing a weak 
opponent, may be enough to add some vitality to the prosecutorial 
discretion option. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 149  8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2013). 
 150  See generally Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants 
Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 
548 (2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED UP FAR AWAY § VII (Dec. 2, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86760/section/8 (describing the phenomenon of 
ICE transfers of detainees to remote locations, and the incumbent strains placed on 
their attorneys, particularly pro bono attorneys). 
 151  Luban, supra note 67, at 1745 (citation omitted).  
 152  As of this writing, there is no data on the superseding Johnson memos. 
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5. Moral (Il)legitimacy of the Rules Governing 
Immigration Lawyers 
To all of these factors enumerated by David Luban in the criminal 
context, I add a fifth that is unique to immigration law.  Lawyers 
practicing in immigration court are governed not just by the rules of 
the bar(s) where they are admitted, but also by the rules of 
immigration court itself, which are set by the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review (“EOIR”), the agency within Department of 
Justice that administers the immigration courts themselves.153  These 
rules apply only to the immigrant’s representative, not to the 
Government attorneys for whom separate rules and regulations exist.154 
This is not merely a question of authorship, but of interest.  Rules 
of professional conduct have long been written by lawyers’ associations 
to govern themselves: a means of regulating themselves so as to avoid 
regulation (and possibly interference) by the Government.155  
Although lawyers presumably have strong self-interest in rules that 
favor their ability to meet their clients’ needs in any way possible, rules 
which were too heavily focused on duties to the client with no 
countervailing duties to the court would likely invite criticism and, 
eventually, governmental rule-setting.  As such, the rules consider a 
number of interests, and attempt to balance those interests, with the 
result being tensions and ambiguities, but ones that lawyers have for 
generations been largely able to navigate. 
By contrast, the rules authored by the immigration court system 
itself favor the court’s interests in excess of what is in state and model 
rules of professional conduct.  Several of the rules are analogous to 
common rules of professional conduct, but not all.  As clinical law 
professor and immigration scholar Lauren Gilbert has shown, the 
EOIR rules have a significant difference when it comes to the lawyer’s 
ability to protect client confidences (explored in Part B).  AILA ethicist 
Reid Trautz underscores this problem: EOIR rules “have no 
 
 153  8 C.F.R. § 1003.102 (2013). 
 154  EOIR, FACT SHEET: PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR IMMIGRATION PRACTITIONERS –
RULES AND PROCEDURES (Aug. 19, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
press/00/profcondfaks.htm.  
 155  Critiques of this, too, abound.  As Patrick J. Schiltz has written: 
I don’t have anything against the formal rules.  Often, they are all that 
stands between an unethical lawyer and a vulnerable client.  You should 
learn them and follow them.  But you should also understand that the 
formal rules represent nothing more than “the lowest common 
denominator of conduct that a highly self-interested group will tolerate.” 
Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy 
and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999) (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, 
Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 730 (1994)). 
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counterpart to Rule 1.6—Maintaining Confidentiality.  None.  The 
federal rules are primarily to benefit the agencies, not clients.  The 
agencies want disclosure.  They value and require candor, so they do 
not address client confidentiality.”156  James Garvin echoes this, noting 
that while the EOIR rules were formulated, among other reasons, with 
an imperative of “safeguarding a vulnerable client population,” the 
rules—unlike those for states—”do not deal nearly so much with 
conduct offensive to individuals as they do with conduct offensive to 
the Government.”157  For these and other reasons, immigration 
attorneys fiercely critiqued the rules when they were proposed.158  
Thus, the EOIR rules of conduct provide another compelling reason 
to embrace zealous advocacy: where attorney choices are sharply 
circumscribed by rules less legitimate than those adopted by state bar 
associations, lawyers should be seeking to push those rules to their 
limits to defend the interests of their clients. 
III. WHY ADOPT A GUIDING PRINCIPLE AT ALL? 
Although immigrants are not entitled to counsel at the 
Government’s expense, when they do secure counsel—and in the 
slowly increasing numbers of cases where appointed counsel is 
provided—they are, at least for now, entitled to have that counsel be 
effective.  There is very little guidance, however, as to what constitutes 
effective counsel in the immigration context, and in any case, as 
discussed above, legally-sufficient effectiveness may differ enormously 
from truly effective lawyering.  In the absence of guidance, ethical 
standards may tend toward the lowest norm permitted under the 
applicable rules of professional conduct particularly since many 
lawyers will never be held accountable for poor-quality lawyering.159  In 
the absence of a well-articulated principle for resolving tensions, 
multiple pressures (described in Part Bmake it far more likely that 
tensions will resolve in favor of the tribunal and not in favor of any one 
particular client.  Articulating the principle of zealous advocacy as an 
obligation of professional responsibility and lawyerly effectiveness 
matters precisely because of all these factors, trends and impulses that 
work against it. 
 
 156  Reid F. Trautz, When a Client Lies: Balancing Confidentiality and Candor (Dec. 18, 
2012), available at http://agora.aila.org/product/detail/1220 (emphasis added) (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
 157  James G. Garvin, Multi-Jurisdictional Disciplinary Enforcement, in AILA, ETHICS IN 
A BRAVE NEW WORLD: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND 
RISK MANAGEMENT FOR IMMIGRATION PRACTITIONERS, AILA (2004) 84.  
 158  Id., at 83. 
 159  Discussed supra in Part 5. 
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A. The Power of Standard Setting: Lessons from Criminal Defense 
Experiences in the criminal context help us see the need for 
articulating standards of effectiveness that include zealousness.  In the 
decades since Gideon v. Wainwright160 established the right indigent 
criminal defendants have to a lawyer, the experience of appointed 
counsel in the criminal setting has shown us that not all defenders are 
equal.  An unfortunate percentage of appointed defenders turn in 
miserably deficient performances.161  Criticisms abound concerning 
the nation’s failure to live up to the promise of Gideon: poor state 
funding162 has led to overwhelmingly large dockets for defenders,163 
exacerbated by the expanded reach of the criminal justice system in an 
era of massive incarceration.164  Compounding these factors is the 
laughably limited protection afforded to defendants who believe they 
have been inadequately represented and who must satisfy the onerous 
ineffective assistance of counsel requirements under Strickland v. 
Washington.165  One prominent criminal defense attorney, Steven 
Bright, has lamented that the Strickland standard “demeans the Sixth 
Amendment” promise of counsel.166  Strickland, famously, allows 
representation by “anyone with a ‘warm body and a law degree’ to 
satisfy the Sixth Amendment.”167 
 
 160  372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 161  See generally Bennett H. Brummer, The Banality of Excessive Defender Workload: 
Managing the Systemic Obstruction of Justice, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 104 (2009).  See also 
Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So.3d 261 (Fl. 2013) 
(holding that enormous workloads violated the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel); Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 682–83 (2007) 
(describing “pervasive” deficiencies in defense).  “The result [of enormous caseloads] 
is rampant ineffectiveness of trial counsel even among conscientious public defenders, 
to say nothing of lawyers who sleep through trial or abuse alcohol and drugs while 
representing their clients.”  Id. at 83. 
 162  Thomas Giovanni and Roopal Patel, Gideon at 50: Three Reforms to Revive the Right 
to Counsel, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (2013), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Gideon_Report_04
0913.pdf. 
 163  Id. 
 164  Abbe Smith has described “the increasingly muted sound of Gideon’s Trumpet 
as the criminal justice system has grown beyond all imagination.”  Abbe Smith, Gideon 
Was a Prisoner: On Criminal Defense in a Time of Mass Incarceration, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1363, 1364 (2013) (citation omitted); see also Paul Butler, Gideon’s Muted Trumpet, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013, at A21. 
 165  466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 166  Steven Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for 
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1883 (1994). 
 167  Abbe Smith, Gideon Was a Prisoner: On Criminal Defense in a Time of Mass 
Incarceration, 70 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1363, 1385 (2013) (quoting David Bazelon, The 
Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811, 819 (1976).  And beyond these 
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Understandably, just as the effectiveness of the criminal defense 
bar ranges widely, so does the level of zealous advocacy.  Often, 
criminal defendants receive subpar, decidedly un-zealous 
representation from appointed counsel.  As Bright has written, “Poor 
people accused of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who 
lack the skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious 
matters.  This fact is confirmed in case after case.”168  This problem has 
been documented and critiqued widely.169  As lawyers have tried to put 
meaning into the Strickland standard, seeking findings that counsel was 
ineffective at the trial level, a pattern of poor representation has 
become part of the story of criminal defense. 
If Strickland represents one force moving toward substandard 
representation, then well-developed principles of zealous advocacy 
constitute a force pushing back against Strickland.  Thanks to the 
exceptional leadership of many defender services and the National 
Legal Aid and Defender Association (“NLADA”), robust standards of 
competent representation have been developed and the best 
defenders provide exceptional service to their clients at defender 
services from Washington, D.C. to Seattle to the Bronx.  NLADA’s role 
articulating and defining the standard for ethical practice of criminal 
defense was recognized by the Supreme Court in Padilla.  In the 
Court’s examination of effectiveness of counsel, the Court emphasized 
the “weight of prevailing professional norms,” citing NLADA and 
others.170 
Among these prevailing norms, zealousness reigns supreme.  
According to NLADA, the very first standard that a defender must 
meet is this: “The paramount obligation of criminal defense counsel is 
to provide zealous and quality representation to their clients at all stages 
of the criminal process.  Attorneys also have an obligation to abide by 
ethical norms and act in accordance with the rules of the court.”171  The 
primacy of zealous advocacy here is clear, tempered by other ethical 
 
existing criticisms, some have said that Strickland is diluted still farther by the Padilla 
decision, imposing a lesser duty of effectiveness on criminal defenders representing 
noncitizens.  See generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Strickland-Lite: Padilla’s 
Two-Tiered Duty for Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 844 (2013) (criticizing the Court’s failure 
to fully remedy the problem of inaccurate advice for noncitizen criminal defendants). 
 168  Bright, supra note 166, at 1836.  But see Butler, supra note 164. 
 169  EMILY M. WEST, COURT FINDINGS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS 
IN POST•CONVICTION APPEALS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA EXONERATION CASES, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT 3 (2010) (noting that 81 percent of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims were rejected in cases where the defendant was ultimately exonerated 
through DNA); Bright, supra note 166. 
 170  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010). 
 171  NLADA Standards, supra note 53 (emphasis added). 
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norms and court-rules.  The specificity of the subsequent standards 
provides a fuller sense of what zealous advocacy entails: undertaking 
every possible motion and action to secure the best outcome for the 
client.  For example, contrary to the conciliatory legal culture that 
exists in many fora, Guideline 5.1 sets the default mode in favor of 
filing pretrial motions; such motions should be filed “whenever there 
exists a good-faith reason to believe that the applicable law may entitle 
the defendant to relief which the court has discretion to grant.”  The 
same guideline states that “[c]ounsel should withdraw or decide not to 
file a motion only after careful consideration.”172 
The articulation of these standards matters.  Literature on 
organizational culture shows that the repeated articulation of values 
and norms influences the conduct of cases.173  As scholar Darryl Brown 
has written, particularly considering the criminal practice setting, “In 
localized, close-knit practice settings, lawyers and judges often adopt 
strong social norms. . . .  On crucial issues, attorney judgment is 
affected by norms that coerce or persuade attorneys to choose options 
they would not otherwise choose, for reasons other than the client’s 
best interest.”174  He goes on to powerfully describe the ways that local 
norms constrain attorneys from filing certain kinds of motions, seeking 
jury trials, and so forth, because the consequences of violating the 
norms are so costly.175  Other scholars have defined legal culture as the 
“bundle of shared, local perceptions and expectations in the operation 
of a legal system.”176  This “bundle” may or may not comport with actual 
laws and regulations, as Brown writes, but they become a set of “‘rules 
of thumb’ that seem to arise spontaneously and supplant the exercise 
of discretion in the mass processing of cases.”177  They may be seen as 
heuristics, mental short-cuts that help attorneys navigate law that “is 
too complex for attorneys to internalize and apply on a daily basis.”178 
 
 172  Id. at 5.1(c) (emphasis added).   
 173  See, e.g., New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the 
Working Group on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1995–99 (2010) (discussing 
systemic and cultural aspects of prosecutorial offices, and how they impact conduct). 
 174  Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, Professionalism, and Lawyering 
Norms, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 803 (2000). 
 175  Id. at 806–13. 
 176  Theresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence 
of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 803 (1994).  See generally Mary Helen McNeal, Slow Down, People 
Breathing: Lawyering, Culture, and Place, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 183, 205–20 (2011) 
(discussing the multiple factors that create and sustain local lawyering cultures). 
 177   Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers’ Heads, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1518 (1996). 
 178  McNeal, supra note 176, at 212.   
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Legal culture is also powerful in terms of ethics.  After studying 
the legal culture of Baltimore attorneys, one scholar noted that “no 
coherent account of professionalism, legal ethics, or the contemporary 
legal profession is possible without understanding the workings of 
practice organizations.”179  And unfortunately, culture is not always in 
a positive relationship with ethics.  Noted ethics scholar Deborah 
Rhode has assessed the impact there has been as the legal profession 
as shifted from “informal regulatory controls” to “reliance on official 
codes.”180  She writes that: 
[A]spirational norms have largely given way to minimal rules.  
The result does not necessarily reflect what most 
commentators (or even lawyers) would consider right or 
moral.  And the danger in diluting the ethical content of 
ethical codes is that they will nonetheless pass for ethics.  New 
entrants are socialized to the lowest common denominator 
of conduct that a highly self-interested group will tolerate.181 
If organizational culture and norms affect the practice of law, as 
they surely do, then the content of professional norms matters greatly 
to the practice of zealous advocacy.  The ethos promoted by a 
commitment to zealous advocacy creates a cultural counterweight to 
prevailing norms of conciliation.  Negotiation, mediation, and other 
forms of alternative dispute resolution dominate civil justice (and 
within civil litigation in particular, some estimate that as many as 99 
percent of cases resolve without going to trial).182  In the criminal 
justice sphere, the vast majority of cases are negotiated, or pleaded, out 
instead of fully litigated.183  This overall tendency toward non-litigation 
is compounded by the dynamics of lawyers who are harried and 
overworked, and who are, perhaps most problematically, subject to the 
“repeat player” dilemma.  This dilemma, well known to practitioners, 
arises when lawyers appear before the same set of judges, against the 
same adversaries, over and over, where relationships and reputation—
not wanting to rock the boat—may inveigh powerfully against 
zealousness.184  Against such a context, the principled articulation of 
 
 179  Id. at 217 (quoting MICHAEL KELLY, THE LIVES OF LAWYERS 18 (1996)) 
 180  Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 730 
(1994). 
 181  Id. 
 182  Hilarie Bass, The End of the Justice System as We Knew It?, 36 LITIGATION 1, 1 (2010). 
 183  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372–73 (2010) (citing statistics from the 
Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics).  See generally Jenny Roberts, Effective 
Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650 (2013) (discussing why a right to effective 
counsel in plea-bargaining should be recognized). 
 184  See, e.g., Mary Helen McNeal, Slow Down, People Breathing: Lawyering, Culture 
and Place, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 183, 216–17 (2011) (discussing the “repeat player” 
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and commitment to zealous advocacy as a guiding principle makes it 
possible to be zealous and for those repeat players to understand that 
the zealousness is the defender doing her or his job. 
NLADA and leading defender services provide the counterpoint 
in an era when there are “too few resources, too many clients, and fee 
systems that discourage zealous advocacy.”185  At their best, these 
organizations deliver client-centered lawyering that—whether the 
client wins, loses or something in-between—helps create procedural 
justice.  Procedural justice sees value in zealous representation where 
it leaves a client trusting (relatively) the fairness of the process, 
regardless of the actual result.  Moreover, the articulation of the 
standard may provide necessary support and encouragement to those 
advocating fiercely for their clients.  As Abbe Smith has written: 
The ethic of zeal is especially important here because it is 
comfortingly simple.  How else might would-be defenders be 
assured that they will be able to do the work and sleep at 
night, and even feel good about it?  The paradigm of 
devotion and zeal serves as both the motivation for doing the 
work and the excuse for doing it well.186 
Robust assertion of ethical standards and precise definitions of 
the elements of zealous advocacy, as embodied by the NLADA 
Standards, is particularly important given the phenomenon of “ethical 
fading.”  Ethical fading is “the cognitive tendency of individuals to 
conflate acting ethically with acting in a self-interested way.”187  
Perceiving our desired actions as unethical leads to cognitive 
dissonance (“as a good person, how could my actions be unethical?”) 
and a corresponding desire to find a way to relieve the dissonance.  As 
described by one of the founding scholars on the subject, “[b]ecause 
the occurrence of cognitive dissonance is unpleasant, people are 
motivated to reduce it; this is roughly analogous to the processes 
involved in the induction and reduction of such drives as hunger or 
thirst—except that, here, the driving force arises from cognitive 
discomfort rather than physiological needs.”188 
 
 
 
phenomenon in criminal, bankruptcy and family law). 
 185  Smith, supra note 55, at 92 (citation omitted). 
 186  Id. at 118. 
 187  Paul R. Tremblay & Judith A. McMorrow, Lawyers and the New Institutionalism, 9 
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 568, 579 (2011). 
 188  Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce 
Policy Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 424 (1999) (quoting ELLIOT ARONSON, THE 
SOCIAL ANIMAL 178 (7th ed., 1995)). 
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A strong organizational culture affects the practice of ethical 
fading by providing a “‘default’ orientation toward which the ‘fading’ 
tends.”189  This is partly because “social organization and, in particular, 
community norms are almost always more important influences on 
individual conduct than formal rules.”  Although more emphasis has 
been placed on the negative effects of ethical fading, it is possible that 
organizational culture promoting strong ethical norms would have a 
comparably powerful effect in a positive direction.190 
While the standards have been developed with specificity for 
certain aspects of criminal practice, Jenny Roberts has shown how 
standards are limited or absent in the particular context of 
misdemeanor court.191  She demonstrates how the absence of such 
powerfully articulated norms permits ineffective assistance of counsel 
in that arena.192  The rest of this Article explores the absence of strongly 
articulated norms in immigration, too, and examines the implications 
of that absence. 
B. The Immigration Bar in the Absence of Heightened Standards 
1. Structure of the Immigration Bar and Disciplinary 
Mechanisms 
Like other administrative law bars, the immigration bar practices 
in a complicated world, often hidden from the view of mainstream 
legal practitioners.  There are two basic streams of immigration 
matters: affirmative applications submitted seeking benefits from the 
Department of Homeland Security, and administrative exclusion and 
removal hearings conducted by the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (“EOIR”), situated in the Department of Justice.  This Article 
focuses on the EOIR removal hearings, although many of the same 
issues apply in DHS applications.  EOIR removal hearings address one 
of two principal legal matters, although procedurally, each looks 
 
 189  Tremblay & McMorrow, supra note 187, at 579. 
 190  “The new institutionalism, however, does not suggest that the norm creation 
will inevitably erode ethical decision-making.”  Tremblay & McMorrow, supra note 187, 
at 579 (quoting Brown, supra note 174, at 813). 
 191  Professor Roberts cites a lack of case law applying Strickland to the lower 
criminal courts.  Roberts, supra note 131, at 315–22.  She also notes the extremely 
limited applicability of professional standards like those from the ABA or the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  “[T]he [ABA Criminal Justice] Standards 
do not address the ways in which defense counsel might effectively represent 
misdemeanor clients, given the particular needs and challenges of misdemeanor 
representation, when the right to counsel applies.  There is a similar lack of guidance 
in other standards . . .” Id. at 329. 
 192  Id. 
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almost exactly the same.  One kind of hearing determines whether 
someone who has not yet been formally admitted can be admitted, or 
instead must be removed; this hearing happens whether or not the 
individual has physically entered the U.S. prior to the removal process 
beginning and the key question is admissibility.  The other kind of 
hearing determines whether someone who has already been formally 
admitted can be removed, and the key question is deportability.193 
Those authorized to appear before EOIR courts include both 
attorneys and a wide range of permissible non-attorney 
representatives.  Federal regulations permit not just licensed attorneys, 
but also supervised law students and law graduates, representatives 
accredited by the Board of Immigration Appeals (a component of 
EOIR), foreign lawyers, and other “reputable individuals.”194 
Those appearing in immigration tribunals are subject to at least 
two different sets of ethics rules.  First, as federal administrative 
tribunals operated by the Department of Justice, practitioners are 
subject to the professional conduct rules that EOIR has promulgated 
specifically for the immigration courts, 195 which encompass many, but 
not all, of the same principles as the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, and they may be sanctioned for violating those rules.196  James 
Gavin, an immigration lawyer who has been active in AILA’s ethics 
work, has categorized these rules, noting that only five of the thirteen 
 
 193  The difference between these two types of cases is critical. For example, in 
“Conditional Admission” and Other Mysteries: Setting the Record Straight on the “Admission” 
Status of Refugees and Asylees, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2014), Laura Tjan-
Murray states: 
A noncitizen’s “admission” status is fundamental to his or her procedural 
options and constitutional standing.  First, it determines whether the 
noncitizen is subject to the grounds of inadmissibility or deportability in 
removal proceedings.  Generally speaking, the latter are far more 
favorable to noncitizens.  A noncitizen’s admission status also may 
control whether she is eligible for bond or subject to mandatory 
detention over the course of proceedings, including during any 
government appeal of a victory by the noncitizen at trial.  Even more 
sobering, whether a noncitizen is deemed “admitted” may be decisive as 
to whether she possesses any constitutional right to be released from 
detention following a removal order—or may be incarcerated 
indefinitely.  Finally, whether and when a noncitizen has been 
“admitted” can determine whether she is eligible for a defense to 
removal or is removable at all. 
 194  8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a) (2008). Although there are no publicly available statistics 
on the breakdown of kinds of appearances, this last category of “reputable individuals” 
appears to be very rare; I have not yet encountered such an appearance in immigration 
court, while other categories are reasonably common.  
 195  8 C.F.R. § 1003.102 (2003). 
 196  8 C.F.R. § 1003.103 (2003) (Immediate suspension and summary disciplinary 
proceedings). 
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have analogs in the Model Rules, while others like the prohibition 
against “contumelious and otherwise obnoxious conduct” and 
“repeated lateness for hearings” do not.197  Second, those practitioners 
who are licensed attorneys are subject to the rules of the state bar(s) to 
which they have been admitted.  As discussed in Part IV, infra, those 
state rules may conflict with EOIR rules, especially where the EOIR 
rules lean more toward duties to the tribunal and not to the client.198 
Immigration lawyers are subject to the same disciplinary 
mechanisms as any of their non-immigration peers, including censure, 
suspension, and disbarment.  These mechanisms can be used both by 
states and by the Department of Justice.199  The extent to which they are 
used is a separate, important question.  EOIR publishes a list of 
suspended and expelled practitioners; as of February 2015, that list 
contained 622 names, of which 198 were disbarred, 88 suspended 
indefinitely, and almost all of the rest suspended between 30 days and 
10 years.200  What cannot be gleaned from EOIR data is the number of 
complaints brought against attorneys—whether directly to EOIR or 
through state bars—that went nowhere, and why.  What also cannot be 
discovered is how many complaints were not brought in the first place.  
Particularly when victims of ineffective assistance are deported, they 
may be unable to pursue a complaint from outside the country.201  Even 
those not deported may be insufficiently familiar with the U.S. legal 
system to be aware of their right to file such complaints—often 
complaints are filed if and when they acquire new counsel who can 
diagnose the prior ineffectiveness.  On the other hand, one factor 
 
 197  James G. Garvin, Multi-Jurisdictional Disciplinary Enforcement, in AILA, ETHICS IN 
A BRAVE NEW WORLD: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND 
RISK MANAGEMENT FOR IMMIGRATION PRACTITIONERS, 84 (2004). 
 198  See, e.g., Lauren Gilbert, Facing Justice: Ethical Choices in Representing Immigrant 
Clients, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 219 (2007); REID TRAUTZ, WHEN GOOD LAWYERS GO 
BAD: STRATEGIES TO REDUCE YOUR RISKS (AILA 2007). 
 199  Executive Office of Immigration Review, List of Currently Disciplined Practitioners, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/discipline.htm (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2015) [hereinafter EOIR DISCIPLINE LIST].  State bar associations also post 
information on attorneys disciplined for various violations of professional conduct in 
the immigration setting, although the data are not published by field of practice and 
are therefore difficult to aggregate.  See., e.g., Maryland Attorney Grievance 
Commission, Maryland Attorneys Disciplinary Actions FY 2015, MDCOURTS.GOV, 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/attygrievance/sanctions15.html (last visited Feb. 28, 
2015). 
 200  EOIR DISCIPLINE LIST, supra note 199. 
 201  The complaint form itself presumes a location within the United States.  EOIR, 
Immigration Practitioner Complaint Form, available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/eoirforms/eoir44.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).  Even if someone filed the 
complaint from another country, the process often involves interviews with witnesses, 
and that could prove difficult for complainants outside the country.  Id. 
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pushes for more complaints to be filed: those who do remain in the 
United States, and have sophisticated legal knowledge or effective new 
counsel, have an incentive to file complaints as a basis for reopening 
their cases.  Matter of Lozada permits immigrants to reopen their cases 
on the basis of prior ineffective assistance of counsel, but must file a 
bar complaint to qualify for reopening.202 
2. Reputation of the Immigration Bar 
Whether due to the mix of individuals able to appear, the 
complexity of the law itself, or some other difficulty, the immigration 
bar (broadly defined) has a poor reputation.  Nightmare stories of 
ineffective, incompetent and fraudulent attorneys abound, such as the 
case study of a New York attorney, Joseph Muto, who routinely missed 
hearings and was ultimately disbarred in New York for acting as a front 
for non-lawyers manufacturing fraudulent cases203 (although his 
punishment before EOIR itself was only a seven year suspension).204  
Another case is that of the Father Bob Vitaligione, an accredited 
representative who was beloved for providing representation to 
thousands of needy individuals, until the extent of his incompetence 
was revealed.205  In both cases, the practitioners seemed to be stepping 
in to help meet immense legal needs, perhaps demonstrating the view 
that any lawyer—even an overworked one—was better than no lawyer.  
But in both cases, their missteps, mistakes and, in the case of Muto, 
fraud, did more damage to their clients than might have happened 
with no lawyer at all.206 
 
 202  Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988), overruled by Matter of 
Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 711 (B.I.A. 2009), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1 (B.I.A. 
2009).  The Lozada approach has been criticized from many angles.  The Attorney 
General in Compean noted that “[b]y making the actual filing of a bar complaint a 
prerequisite for obtaining (or even seeking) relief, it appears that Lozada may 
inadvertently have contributed to the filing of many unfounded or even frivolous 
complaints.”  Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 737.  One scholar proposed doing away with 
the bar complaint requirement, noting that the goals of validity and notice are met by 
other aspects of the Lozada procedure.  Aliza B. Kaplan, A New Approach to Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 367–68 (2010). 
 203  Richard L. Abel, Practicing Immigration Law in Filene’s Basement, 84 N.C. L. REV. 
1449 (2006). 
 204  EOIR DISCIPLINE LIST, supra note 199. 
 205  Sam Dolnick, Removal of Priest’s Cases Exposes Deep Hole in Immigration Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/nyregion/priests-former-
caseload-exposes-holes-in-immigration-courts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 206  Indeed, regulations require that both the Immigration Judge and ICE attempt 
to identify what relief might be available for pro se individuals, and judges often urge 
individuals for whom some relief might be available to try even harder to find an 
attorney for their case.  At least the “regulations require” claim should have a citation.  
Such a pro se individual is far better off than if represented at the outset by someone 
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Due to well-known stories like those above and many others, as 
prominent immigration attorney Michael Maggio noted, “the 
collective ethical reputation of the immigration bar, which has never 
been great, is worse now than ever.”207  Maggio, whose own zealous 
advocacy was a trademark of his career,208 thoughtfully lays out the 
multiple dimensions of the ethics challenges facing the immigration 
bar, noting how some of the least experienced immigration 
practitioners are among the most likely to be working on the most 
complex cases for the most vulnerable clients.  More seasoned lawyers, 
he notes, tend to derive business from the world of labor certifications, 
which require craftsmanship and great skill, but are not as treacherous 
as removal proceedings, asylum cases and so forth.209 
The American Immigration Lawyers Association has done 
enormous work trying to address the challenge noted by Michael 
Maggio.  In addition to employing someone full time to educate 
members on ethics issues, the website for AILA members features 
practice and professionalism prominently on its homepage, and links 
to ethics publications and state-by-state compendia of rules providing 
guidance to immigration lawyers.210  It also has a message board where 
members can seek guidance on ethical obligations and dilemmas, but 
these mostly focus on matters beyond removal proceedings (such as 
the dual representation problems in employment-based and family-
based applications).211  Given the non-adversarial context of these 
inquiries, it is perhaps unsurprising that the thoughtful analysis found 
in these resources tends to be fairly conservative in its approach—
focusing carefully on lawyer liability exposure, and not on zealous 
 
like Muto or Vitaligione who misses hearings, fails to screen for relief, and concedes 
removability or seeks voluntary departure when other, better courses of action were 
available. 
 207  Michael Maggio, Matter of Ethics, in BRAVE NEW WORLD supra, note 157. 
 208  Patricia Sullivan, Immigration Lawyer Michael A. Maggio, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 
2008), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-02-12/news/36922813_1_fight-
deportation-immigration-lawyer-ins-agents; Firm Carries on Michael Maggio’s Pro Bono 
Legacy, AILA , http://ailahub.aila.org/i/49654/2 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).  
 209  Maggio, supra note 207. 
 210  AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, www.aila.org (last visited Feb. 28, 
2015).  A post in the message board available to members solicits ethics articles that 
AILA is interested in publishing, and suggests that “possible topics include advertising 
immigration legal services across state lines, application of ethics rules on global 
practice, ‘unbundling’ legal services, and oversight of independent paralegals.”  (Post, 
Sept. 20, 2013).  While these are undoubtedly important topics, they do not cover 
anything close to the topic of zealous advocacy in immigration removal. 
 211  See, e.g., Jill Marie Bussey & Jane W. Chen, A Primer on the Ethical Considerations 
in Family-Based Practice, AILA (2010); Trautz, supra note 198; Hilary Sheard, Ethical 
Issues in Immigration Proceedings, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 719 (1995). 
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advocacy for clients.  Furthermore, AILA—while exceptionally 
influential for immigration practitioners—is a membership 
organization, and not all immigration lawyers pay the dues needed to 
access these resources.212 
In the removal context, one resource does lay out detailed steps 
that lawyers can take to prepare and defend their cases effectively: The 
Immigration Trial Handbook.213  This resource has a wealth of 
information relevant to different stages of trial preparation, and 
provides a path for advocates to be extremely effective, and at times 
zealous.214  It carries less authority for articulating standards of 
zealousness for the profession, however, than something like the 
NLADA standards developed for criminal defenders.215  It is a private 
publication not developed as part of an effort to reach consensus about 
professional standards of effectiveness.  As such, it falls well short of 
even the voluntary NLADA standards.  Clearly, many lawyers do 
routinely practice zealously in immigration removal; the concern of 
this article is that they are unsupported and too often alone, not able 
to relay on a legal culture shared throughout the immigration bar.  
The flip side of this tarnished coin is that those lawyers who do not 
practice zealously have no commonly accepted standards in this 
practice area showing them precisely the degree to which they are 
falling short. 
3. Efforts to Extend Gideon 
Into this confounding world where lawyers and many kinds of 
non-lawyers can practice, and where unique and multiple ethical rules 
govern those who practice, come the questions of right to counsel, and 
the importance of that counsel being effective.  The former question 
has been studied in some depth, but only recently has attention turned 
 
 212  It is not possible to state how many immigration lawyers are not AILA members, 
especially because attorneys practicing in immigration court may consider themselves 
general practitioners working in multiple fields.  But the dues likely price some 
percentage of lawyers out of membership, even where they are interested.  For 2014, 
they range from $125 for non-profit attorneys to $455 for regular members with 7+ 
years of practice.  2014 AILA Dues Structure, AILA.ORG, http://www.aila.org/ 
membership/join (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). For an excellent study of the impact of 
AILA on immigration lawyer practices and actions, see Leslie Levin, Specialty Bars as a 
Site of Professionalism : The Immigration Bar Example, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 194 (2011).  
 213  MARIA BALDINI-POTERMIN, IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK (2013) [hereinafter 
IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK]. 
 214  Id. at § 7:12.  For example, it says that “counsel can and should object to [the] 
admission” of Form-213 when it contains information the client disputes. 
 215  Blue Ribbon Advisory Committee on Indigent Defense Services (1996), NLADA.ORG, 
available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Blue_Ribbon. 
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to the latter question.216 
The right to appointed counsel matters in a world where so many 
are unrepresented.  During FY 2012, only 56 percent of immigrants 
had representation in removal proceedings.217  The increasing use of 
detention, particularly in isolated locations, also decreases the ability 
of immigrants to secure representation.218  Pro bono legal services for 
detainees are exceptionally limited, largely because of time and travel 
costs associated with access to far-flung facilities, such that a single two-
hour interview with one client might consume 8–10 hours of an 
attorney’s day.219  At the same time and travel costs make private 
representation more expensive than many detainees can afford.220  
Even facilities close to major metropolitan areas have very low rates of 
representation for detainees, with one New York study showing only 40 
percent have counsel by the time their hearing is completed 
(compared to 73 percent for those who are not detained).221  Farther 
afield, that rate tumbles to 21 percent.222  And “farther afield” is 
increasingly the norm in immigration detention.  With roughly 36 
percent of the immigration courts’ cases comprised of detained 
cases,223 these high rates of being unrepresented represent a significant 
problem. 
Since 1989, there have been programs around the country trying 
to improve access to justice by providing pro bono representation and/
or legal representation to detainees in different ways.224  The Florence 
 
 216  Compare Beth Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in 
Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393 (2000) with Hamutal Bernstein 
and Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Improving Immigration Adjudications Through Competent 
Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2008). 
 217  EOIR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 145, at G1.   
 218  Stacy Caplow has done statistical analysis of the rise of detained cases within the 
immigration court system.  Stacy Caplow, After the Flood: The Legacy of the Surge of Federal 
Immigration Appeals, 7 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 25–26 (2012).  Criticisms of ICE’s 
detention quota abound.  See e.g., Morgenthau, supra note 148. 
 219  Consider, for example, an attorney in Washington, D.C. representing a 
detainee in Farmville, Virginia, 170 miles away.  Driving time each way is roughly three 
hours without traffic, and there can be significant delays between arriving at the 
detention facility and actually seeing the detainee client. 
 220  Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing 
Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 548–59 
(2009). 
 221  The New York Immigrant Representation Study: Preliminary Findings, N.Y. TIMES (May 
3, 2011), available at  http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/050411 
immigrant.pdf.  
 222  Id. 
 223  EOIR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 145, at O1. 
 224  Ingrid V. Eagly has examined the ways that current legal service provision (via 
non-profits, pro bono representation, and law school clinics) could provide a 
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Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project has been representing 
immigrants and providing legal information to thousands of 
unrepresented immigrants at detention facilities in Arizona since 
1989, and in that same year the American Bar Association, AILA and 
the State Bar of Texas set up ProBar to improve access to justice for 
immigrants in South Texas.225  Since that time, legal orientation 
programs (LOPs) have increased massively in scale, under the 
monitoring of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Access 
Programs.226  Since 2008, the American Bar Association, in 
collaboration with several other entities, founded the Immigration 
Justice Project of San Diego to respond to the crisis in lack of 
representation.  The project uses a network of pro bono attorneys to 
“promote due process and access to justice at all levels of the 
immigration and appellate court system.”227  The project specifically 
notes that the pro bono assistance is to be of “high-quality,” although 
it does not define that term.228 
Recognizing that such programs are, at best, a patchwork 
solution, there have been increasing—and increasingly effective—calls 
from the bar, policy advocates and legal scholars to recognize a right 
to appointed counsel in specific contexts.  The quest to extend Gideon 
to the immigration context began decades ago and has been studied 
and justified in academic and policy literature.229  These authors seek 
 
foundation for expanding Gideon to immigration practice.  Eagly, supra note 74. 
 225  Our History, THE FLORENCE IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS PROJECT, 
http://www.firrp.org/who/history/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015); What Is ProBAR, 
PROBAR DETENTION PROJECT, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/immigration/probar/probaradultsbrochure7-12.authcheckdam.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
 226  Office of Legal Access Programs, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/probono/probono.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
 227  Immigration Justice Project (IJP) of San Diego: About Us, ABA.ORG, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/immigration/projects_initiati
ves/immigration_justice_project_ijp_of_san_diego/about_us.html (last visited Feb. 
28. 2015). 
 228  Id.  Professor Andrew Schoenholtz and Hamutal Bernstein also note the 
importance of competence: “The crucial role of competent representation is one of 
the motivating factors behind the ABA Immigration Justice Project, which seeks not 
only to provide representation but also to train and prepare counsel in order to 
provide competent services.”  Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal Bernstein, Improving 
Immigration Adjudications Through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 59 
(2008). 
 229  See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag & Ahilan Arulanantham, Extending the Promise of Gideon: 
Immigration, Deportation, and the Right to Counsel, 39 ABA HUMAN RIGHTS MAGAZINE, no. 
4, (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_ 
home/2013_vol_39/vol_30_no_4_gideon/extending_the_promise_of_gideon.html; 
Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel no. 4 (Apr. 2005), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/revisiting-need-appointed-counsel; Beth I. 
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the extension of Gideon appointed counsel to immigration proceedings 
generally, for reasons very similar to the ones set forth in Part I, supra, 
comparing the immigration and criminal systems’ stakes, complexity 
and power-imbalances.230  Others have begun the process of defining 
specific contexts within immigration law that might justify the 
appointment of counsel.231 
The phenomenon of appointed counsel in the immigration 
context is becoming more widespread for two reasons: development of 
case law providing counsel as a matter of due process, and expansion 
of appointed counsel through statutes or Government programs.  First, 
the M-A-M- case recognized deficiencies in the due process available to 
mentally incompetent immigrants in the immigration court system.232  
The court in M-A-M- considered the Fifth Amendment due process 
rights of immigrants in removal proceedings, applying the standard of 
“fundamental fairness” to the question of whether a mentally 
incompetent individual had a right to appointed counsel in this 
particular civil context.233  Turner v. Rogers234  which examined the right 
to counsel in a child support enforcement case where the father was 
incarcerated, likewise offered a framework for evaluating Fifth 
Amendment due process right to counsel.  While the Court found no 
right in that particular case, its framework, as scholar Ingrid Eagly has 
shown, could justify appointed counsel in the immigration context.235 
 
Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 
20 B. C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 393 (2000). 
 230  Id. 
 231  Kevin Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE 
L.J. 2394 (2013) (appointment of counsel for lawful permanent residents in removal 
proceedings); Noferi, supra note 107 (appointment of counsel for hearings to 
determine whether mandatory detention applies); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is 
Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1359–60 (2011) (right to counsel for immigrants 
in removal proceedings because of a criminal conviction, post-Padilla). 
 232  Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011).  This marked a leap forward 
from the statutory standard simply requiring the mentally incompetent individual’s 
rights to be protected, without stating how such rights were to be protected:  
If it is impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental incompetency for the 
alien to be present at the proceeding, the Attorney General shall 
prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and privileges of the alien . . . .  
The Act’s invocation of safeguards presumes that proceedings can go 
forward, even where the alien is incompetent, provided the proceeding 
is conducted fairly. 
Id. at 477 (internal citations omitted). 
 233  Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I & N Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011). 
 234  131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). 
 235  Eagly, supra note 74, at 2302–03 (noting that if the framework requires 
“weighing case complexity, representation status of the parties, and available 
procedural safeguards” it could justify appointed counsel in the immigration context). 
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Second, appointed counsel is increasing as a legislative matter, 
and may continue to increase through immigration and other reforms.  
The Senate immigration bill, passed in June 2013, permitted 
appointed counsel for any proceeding at the discretion of the 
immigration judge, but required appointment of counsel for minors 
and mentally incompetent individuals.236  Then, without waiting for 
federal reform, New York City created the first publicly funded 
“defender system” for immigrants in removal proceedings, in July 
2013.237  The $500,000 allocation creates a pilot project that would 
provide representation to 135 individuals.238  If expanded, the project 
would coordinate a network of lawyers drawn from both private firms 
and non-profit immigration legal service providers.239  As Ingrid Eagly 
has noted, “[r]egardless of how courts ultimately resolve the 
constitutional question, all levels of Government retain the ability to 
take legislative action to expand access to appointed counsel.”240 
C. New Focus on Effectiveness of Counsel 
Clearly, appointed counsel is increasing, and likely to increase 
further, either through litigation or legislation.  Appointment of 
counsel is, however, merely a starting point in considering access to 
justice.  Increasingly, scholars are also looking at the effectiveness of 
the counsel that immigrants do have.  As Professor Andrew 
Schoenholtz and Hamutal Bernstein write: 
 
 
 
 236  S.B. 744, § 3502(c) (2013) reads: 
Notwithstanding subsection (b) [providing discretionary authority to 
appoint counsel], the Attorney General shall appoint counsel, at the 
expense of the Government, if necessary, to represent an alien in a 
removal proceeding who has been determined by the Secretary to be an 
unaccompanied alien child, is incompetent to represent himself or 
herself due to a serious mental disability that would be included in 
section 3(2) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 
12102(2)), or is considered particularly vulnerable when compared to 
other aliens in removal proceedings, such that the appointment of 
counsel is necessary to help ensure fair resolution and efficient 
adjudication of the proceedings. 
 237  Kirk Semple, City to Help Immigrants Seeking Deportation Reprieves, N.Y. TIMES (July 
27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/nyregion/city-to-help-immigrants-
seeking-deportation-reprieves.html?ref=nyregion&_r=0. 
 238  Id.  
 239  PETER L. MARKOWITZ, PROTOCOL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER 
IMMIGRATION SERVICE PLAN (2009), http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2011/03/Protocol.pdf.  
 240  Eagly, supra note 74, at 2303.  
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The problem is not only lack of representation but also poor 
quality of representation.  Low-quality representation is too 
often the case at the Immigration Court level.  Some 
applicants manage to secure representation, but their 
representative (1) may not have the appropriate legal 
expertise, (2) may be overloaded with too many cases, (3) 
may not give due attention and care to individuals, or (4) 
may even be fraudulent.241 
Chief Immigration Judge Juan Osuna has similarly emphasized that 
counsel is not enough, and that the representation itself must be good: 
“Good lawyers help immigrants navigate a complex process. . . . [T]he 
system overall benefits when good lawyers get involved.”242  Judge M. 
Margaret McKeown and Allegra McLeod have also examined the 
question of effectiveness, looking at such trademarks of bad lawyering 
as placing clients unnecessarily into removal proceedings and failing 
to offer evidence, concluding that the view that any lawyer is better 
than no lawyer is fundamentally in error, a conclusion this Article 
supports.243 
Beyond avoiding the importance of avoiding such unarguably bad 
lawyering (an important and herculean task in and of itself), this 
Article wants to ensure that our definition of competence is defined 
not against the lowest common denominator, but upward toward an 
aspirational standard.  The way that zealous advocacy can make a 
practical difference in establishing a better standard for immigration 
lawyers is the subject of the next section of this article. 
 
IV. THE IMPACT AND LIMITATIONS OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY AS A 
GUIDING PRINCIPLE 
A. Where Zealousness Might Make a Difference 
There are multiple scenarios in immigration court where 
zealousness would be somewhat counter-cultural and could work to the 
benefit of clients, particularly those with more limited options or cases 
with weaker evidence.  Certainly, many lawyers already do these things.  
However, in the fast-paced world of master calendars, where dozens of 
cases are processed swiftly, and trials that are condensed to just two or 
 
 241  Schoenholtz & Bernstein, supra note 228 at 59–60. 
 242  Allegra McLeod & M. Margaret McKeown, The Counsel Conundrum: Effective 
Representation in Immigration Proceedings, in ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ, PHILIP G. SCHRAG 
& JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 286–306 (New York: New York University Press 2009).  
 243  Id. 
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three hours, many of these maneuvers are exceedingly rare. 
This section concretizes the notion of zealous advocacy in the 
immigration context.  But it is also worth noting at the outset what, in 
this author’s view, zealous advocacy is not: It is not uncivil and it is not 
dishonest.  Zealousness may seem to demand an aggressive style or 
promote a propensity to exaggerate evidence.  While different lawyers 
have different styles, incivility rarely serves any good purpose, and 
attorney dishonesty hurts not just the integrity of the system, but the 
interests of the clients known to be represented by someone with a 
reputation for dishonesty.  The scenarios below show multiple contexts 
in which a lawyer can be zealous while remaining civil and honest. 
1. Putting the Government to its Burden 
The Government has the initial burden in a removal proceeding, 
to establish alienage, i.e. that the immigrant is not a U.S. citizen.244  
Once this burden is met, the burden shifts to the immigrant to prove 
he or she has a right to remain, and/or a defense to removal.245 
The Government may seek to meet its burden by submitting a 
Form I-213 (“record of deportable alien”) at the initial status hearing 
for a removal proceeding (the “master calendar”), although such 
documents are also introduced later, just for impeachment purposes 
during an individual hearing.246  The Form I-213 contains information 
about the immigrant and the circumstances of his or her arrest and, if 
relevant, criminal history.247  Immigration agents also include in Form 
I-213 any statements made by the immigrant upon arrest by DHS, as 
well as information from investigations made by ICE or other agencies 
pertaining to the immigrant.248  The document is signed only by the 
arresting agent, and by the receiving officer who authorizes 
prosecution of the case.  The court considers Form I-213 “inherently 
trustworthy,” as a default matter, despite the presence of hearsay on 
the document.249  The Form often contains information that is 
prejudicial to the immigrant’s case, including the facts that the 
Government can use to meet its burden of establishing alienage, like 
 
 244  INA § 240(c)(3)(A). 
 245  INA § 240(c)(2). 
 246  Matter of Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 784, 785 (B.I.A. 1999) (“[A]bsent 
any evidence that a Form I-213 contains information that is incorrect or was obtained 
by coercion or duress, that document is inherently trustworthy and admissible as 
evidence to prove alienage or deportability.”) (citation omitted). 
 247  IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK, supra note 213, at § 7:12.  Matter of Mejia, 16 I. 
& N. Dec. 6 (B.I.A. 1976). 
 248  IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK, supra note 213. 
 249  Matter of Mejia, 16 I. & N. Dec. 6, 8 (B.I.A. 1976).  
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nationality, and date, place and manner of entry.  The form may also 
include allegations of criminal involvement not supported by records 
of conviction.250 
Despite its “inherent reliability,” advocates can challenge the 
admission of the Form.  One reason for objection is that rarely has the 
lawyer been given a chance to examine it more than cursorily before 
the Government seeks to have it admitted.  The lawyer has a statutory 
right to examine the evidence251 a right that is diminished when custom 
and collegiality subtly pressure a decision to go along to get along and 
not waste the court’s time by examining the document closely.  
Another is a simple objection to its hearsay, which, while likely to be 
overruled, preserves the objection for appeal if necessary; just because 
an objection is unlikely to be sustained does not mean the lawyer 
should resist making it.  This is fairly cost-less zealous advocacy: 
something well within a lawyer’s ability to do with minimal disruption 
of the litigation for either side.  It is thus a place where zealous 
advocacy would prove easy to apply if adopted as a guiding principle. 
The Government also meets its burden when the immigrant 
concedes the allegations made on the Notice to Appear (Form I-286, 
“NTA”).252  The NTA usually makes several factual allegations, 
including: nationality, date, and place and manner of entry, and 
sometimes other allegations about criminal activity, failure to remain 
in status, or others.  Regulations provide for many different reasons 
why a notice to appear can be canceled,253 from contesting the 
allegations, to asserting that the individual is actually a citizen of the 
U.S., to asserting that the notice was “improvidently issued.”  There is 
no data available showing the number of cases where an immigrant 
objects to admission of the NTA, but any observation of a master 
calendar shows how unusual it is to see attorneys make objections to 
the NTA or deny allegations thereon (except, sometimes, to make 
technical corrections which can be—and are—rapidly resolved with 
the issuance of a new NTA).  When the newly created New York 
Immigration Defenders corps began litigating cases, their routine  
denial of NTAs sparked notice from lawyers unaccustomed to seeing 
 
 250  While frequently damaging to the immigrant’s case, the Immigration Trial 
Handbook also notes that Form I-213 may contain information about the arrest that 
could provide the basis for a Motion to Suppress Evidence.  IMMIGRATION TRIAL 
HANDBOOK, supra note 213, at § 7:12. 
 251  INA § 240(b)(4)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2013). 
 252  8 C.F.R. § 1240.8 (2013). 
 253  8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (2013).  The Immigration Trial Handbook lists eleven 
different means of challenging a notice to appear, most of which derive from the 
immigration regulations.  IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK, supra note 213, at 5:10. 
KEYES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2015  9:27 PM 
530 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:475 
that done.254 
When the allegations stem from evidence obtained 
unconstitutionally, lawyers can—and should—deny the allegations 
and pursue a Motion to Suppress Evidence.  The regulations 
themselves provide for this: When the NTA is “issued under 
circumstances involving duress, a lack of due process, violations of a 
noncitizen’s rights under the regulations, or other violation of a 
constitutional right,” it may be challenged.255  Matter of Garcia256 provides 
one excellent example of this, although its contours are currently the 
subject of federal litigation.257  The BIA found that Mr. Garcia’s 
statements were made involuntarily when the then-INS handcuffed 
him and repeatedly refused him access to his attorney, even erasing 
the attorney’s number from Mr. Garcia’s arm (where he had written 
it).258 
Beyond the regulatory violations, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza259 opened 
the door to filing suppression motions under the Fourth Amendment 
when abuses were egregious, and possibly even more widely than 
that.260  Concurrent with the rise in immigration enforcement done by 
local law enforcement agents, such constitutional issues have risen in 
immigration court as well, but are still a relatively unusual basis for 
challenging a NTA.  This is so partly because Lopez-Mendoza is 
sometimes read as saying that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary 
rule does not apply in immigration court,261 and partly because such 
 
 254  Rich commentary on this phenomenon emerged in a closed Facebook group 
for private immigration lawyers. (Sept. 11, 2014) (entire thread on file with author). 
 255  Absent proof that a Form I-213 contains information that is incorrect or was 
obtained by coercion or duress, that document is inherently trustworthy and 
admissible as evidence to prove alienage and deportability or inadmissibility. Matter of 
Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609 (B.I.A. 1988); Matter of Mejia, 16 I&N Dec. 6 (B.I.A. 1976). 
 256  Matter of Garcia, 17 I.&N. Dec. 319 (B.I.A. 1980). 
 257  The BIA held in 2011 that statements made prior to the issuance of an NTA.  
Id. 
 258  Id. at 320. 
 259  104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984). 
 260  The American Immigration Council Legal Action Center (affiliated with the 
American Immigration Lawyers Association) has shown how much of the reasoning 
behind Lopez-Mendoza’s “egregious violations” standard is based on facts no longer true 
in the present-day immigration enforcement apparatus.  Practice Advisory: Motions to 
Suppress in Removal Proceedings: Cracking Down on Fourth Amendment Violations by State and 
Local Law Enforcement Officers, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL LEGAL ACTION CENTER 
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/motions_to_ 
suppress_in_removal_proceedings-
_cracking_down_on_fourth_amendment_violations.pdf. 
 261  Deborah Anker, Asylum Status, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION TRAINING, C394 ALI-ABA 355 (Apr. 1989) (citing C. Slovinsky & M. Van 
Der Hout, Motions to Suppress After Delgado and Lopez–Mendoza, 13 IMMIGRATION 
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litigation is poorly understood.262 Moreover, as one practice resource 
notes, “[Filing a motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment] 
will not endear you to the Office of Chief Counsel and may adversely 
affect how DHS trial attorneys think of you and treat you.”263  Here, the 
disruption to the litigation is significant; such motions can take years 
to resolve as both sides work their way through appeals.  Moreover, the 
reputational costs to the disruptive litigator can be significant.264  
However, disruption in defense of a constitutional right is at the least 
ethically defensible, under a guiding principle of zealous advocacy 
would be required to be a truly effective attorney.265  Understanding the 
tactic as a key piece of effectiveness might reduce the reputational costs 
borne by lawyers who, at present, are litigating against cultural norms 
in immigration court. 
2. Fighting Within Any Given Case 
Zealousness also may shape how any given case is litigated, and 
will affect how well an attorney deploys motions, calls witnesses, 
counsels a client, or pushes to have evidence introduced.  Even where 
there is no basic conflict in duties, the absence of a strongly articulated 
principle of zealous advocacy matters if the legal culture, as described 
in Part III(A) supra, deters such ethically permissible conduct simply 
as a matter of custom. 
One scenario is not unique to immigration practice but is 
powerful there: the familiar scenario of the judge who wishes to hurry 
along proceedings.  Imagine an immigration judge who wants to rush 
through testimony in a particular case because an overcrowded docket 
in the system generally has left her with too little time to patiently hear 
all the testimony.  Does the lawyer push back and insist?  Make an 
objection for the record?  This is not a difficult choice, and a zealous 
 
NEWSLETTER No. 5–6 at 1 (1984).  
 262  See generally Maureen Sweeney, Shadow Immigration Enforcement, 104 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 227, 277-79 (2014) (describing the lack of an analytical framework for 
immigration judges to determine motions to suppress, and noting the attendant 
confusion when such motions are filed). 
 263  Motions to Suppress in Removal Proceedings: A General Overview 34, AMERICAN 
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL LEGAL ACTION CENTER http://www.legalactioncenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/motions_to_suppress_in_removal_proceedings-
_a_general_overview_1-26-15_fin.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).  
 264  From discussion of an earlier draft of this Article, at the Mid-Atlantic Clinical 
Theory Workshop, held at University of Baltimore (Feb. 2014) (notes on file with 
author). 
 265  Indeed, the Sixth Circuit just found that an unwarranted concession of 
removability by an immigrant’s prior counsel constituted egregious circumstances, 
sufficient to allow the individual to reopen proceedings and withdraw the original 
admissions and concessions.  See Hanna v. Holder, 740 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2014).  
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advocate would do at least one of those two things.  But when 
zealousness is not the norm, and there are powerful pressures to please 
the Court, to be a good repeat player in the system, some lawyers will 
refrain from doing either of these simple litigation maneuvers, 
privileging the legal system over their client. 
More difficult is the question of truthfulness and the lawyer’s role 
in eliciting and presenting the truth.  A common example of this arises 
for those seeking relief by applying for a crime-victim visa (a “U visa”) 
from USCIS, an increasingly prevalent way to gain immigration 
status.266  Although not adjudicated in court, courts often permit 
continuances if an immigrant appears to have a chance of regularizing 
status through an application to USCIS, and will postpone proceedings 
while that application is adjudicated.  One question asked on the U 
visa application is “Have you EVER committed a crime or offense for 
which you have not been arrested?”267  Some lawyers believe that they 
must answer “yes” to this question if the client discloses any possible 
transgressions (and because the lawyer must ensure that the client has 
answered every question on the form, this is information the lawyer will 
obtain from a client who is reasonably forthcoming).  Others argue 
that the question itself implies that that no judge or jury has found the 
immigrant guilty of any offense, so it cannot be known with certainty 
whether there was a crime or offense committed at all.  In this view, 
the lack of certainty permits a “no” answer even in the presence of 
questionable conduct.268 
The fact that there are two possible paths demonstrates that this 
is an ethical gray area, where different actions may both be justified, 
and where duties come into sharp tension.  On the one hand, the path 
of saying “yes” puts the lawyer in the role of being judge and jury for 
 
 266  The visa came into creation in 2000, but lacked implementing regulations until 
2008.  Since then, through trainings and education, it has become widely known and 
widely sought.  Ten thousand of such visas are available each year, and USCIS now 
routinely meets that quota.  USCIS Approves 10,000 U Visas for 5th Straight Fiscal Year, 
USCIS (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-approves-10000-u-
visas-5th-straight-fiscal-year. 
 267  I-918, Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status, at 3, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERVICES, available at http://www.uscis.gov/i-918 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
 268  Still others say that the information is protected by the Fifth Amendment right 
to remain silent, but such a right must be invoked and in a civil matter, such as the 
adjudication of a U visa, invocation of the right permits the decision-maker to make 
an inference of guilt.  See Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (2011).  
Furthermore, while in a civil proceeding, an individual may invoke the Fifth 
Amendment, and let the fact-finder draw what conclusions they will from its 
invocation, there is no mechanism for doing so in immigration applications, short—
perhaps—of writing “I invoke the Fifth Amendment” in the margin of the form or in 
a supplement. 
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their own client, which is squarely in collision with duties to the 
client—and yet, to lawyers making this choice, this likely feels like a 
fairly safe ethical choice, privileging the legal system over the client.  It 
may be unfortunate and frustrating, but not unethical.  Why that seems 
like the straightforward ethical choice is difficult to know.  Perhaps 
answering yes appeals to the lawyer’s need to prove that lawyers can be 
honest, contradicting the profession’s (unearned) reputation for 
pervasive dishonesty.  Perhaps answering yes shows respect or even 
some awe for the legal system, the same system that drew the lawyer 
into the profession in the first place.  Answering yes may let the lawyer 
align with the legal system in a gatekeeping role that feels important, 
even if wrongly ascribed in an adversarial context.269  Regardless, it is a 
safe choice that is unlikely to bear any negatives consequences for the 
lawyer.270 
On the other hand, the defensible path of saying “no” even when 
possibly the truth is “yes,” is a choice made by the zealous advocate, but 
for the risk-averse among us, this choice comes uncomfortably close to 
a collision with duties to the legal system.  And why is that?  Again, legal 
cultures develop shared norms, and it is difficult for lawyers to go 
against those norms.  Because zealous advocacy is not the guiding 
principle within immigration law, a borderline decision such as this 
may lead to considerable discomfort with going against the cultural 
grain.  A clearer, well-defined and broadly shared value of zealousness 
might ease that discomfort and make it easier to tip the balance toward 
duties to the client. 
Another area where lawyers self-censor is in providing evidence to 
the tribunal.  It is broadly understood that the Model Rules prohibit a 
lawyer from acting simultaneously as witness and advocate in a 
particular trial.271  However, this rule, Rule 3.7 (which has no analog in 
the rules governing immigration court appearances) contains an 
exception for situations where “disqualification of the lawyer would 
work substantial hardship on the client.”272  Arguably, this exception 
applies frequently in the context of asylum litigation, where the 
attorney is a witness to efforts to corroborate the asylum-seeker’s claim.  
In asylum cases, the legal standard is that applicant’s own statement 
 
 269  The gatekeeping role has been suggested in non-litigation contexts like 
corporate counsel work.  See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1167 (2005). 
 270  The reason the lawyer is unlikely to face consequences from the client whose 
duty was compromised is addressed in Part III.B.1, supra.  
 271  ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (1983). 
 272  Id.  
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may be sufficient to win asylum, but only when it would not be 
reasonable to expect corroboration.273  This legal standard has been 
criticized as disadvantaging asylum-seekers who cannot produce 
adequate corroboration, and who cannot know what any particular 
immigration judge will expect to be “reasonably available.”274  
Sometimes the client can offer testimony about attempts to obtain 
evidence, but often it is the lawyer who has done much of the case 
investigation, and knows much better than the client how hard or easy 
a particular document or witness statement was to obtain.275  In a well-
known case study from Georgetown Law’s Center for Applied Legal 
Studies, students went to heroic lengths and deployed extraordinary 
creativity to find a key witness for their client’s case.276  They succeeded, 
but had they not ultimately succeeded (and not all efforts yield such 
excellent results), their efforts are surely evidence relevant to the 
determination of what evidence was “reasonably available” in the 
case—and therefore precluding testimony would impose substantial 
hardship on the client and thus meet the Rule 3.7 exception.  Yet this 
thorough reading of the rule, coupled with a legal culture that assumes 
lawyers cannot offer testimony, could prevent such evidence from 
being offered at all.  A legal culture that had zealous advocacy 
embedded as a guiding principle might lead more attorneys to try. 
B. When Zealous Advocacy is Impossible 
While zealous advocacy can resolve some dilemmas like those 
described so far in this section, there are other situations in 
immigration court, particularly as concerns candor to the tribunal, 
where it is simply not possible.  Immigration law is not unique for 
experiencing tensions in the ethical rules where further guidance is 
needed.  Such tensions have been examined in a variety of contexts.277  
Nonetheless, immigration law, and particularly the practice in 
immigration court where removal hearings are heard, is rife with such 
dilemmas, and those dilemmas often turn upon whether the lawyer 
 
 273  REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat. 231; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West 
2015).  
 274  Deborah Anker, Emily Gumper, Jean C. Han & Matthew Muller, Any Real 
Change? Credibility and Corroboration After the REAL ID Act, in IMMIGRATION & 
NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK (2008–09). 
 275  See, e.g., DAVID NGARURI KENNEY & PHIL SCHRAG, ASYLUM DENIED 136 (2009) 
(describing the efforts made by student attorneys to find a copy of a key news article 
in an asylum case).  
 276  Agata Szypszak, Where in the World is Dr. Detchakandi? A Story of Fact Investigation, 
6 CLINICAL L. REV. 517 (2000). 
 277  Andrews, supra note 14. 
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chooses to favor duties to the client over duties to the court, or vice 
versa.  Under different sets of ethical rules, lawyers have some grey area 
within which they can navigate competing duties and make a range of 
choices.  That range of choices is sharply curtailed in immigration 
court, leaving lawyers in an untenable position. 
AILA ethicist Reid Trautz introduces us to this problem: 
Our profession’s ethical rules of conduct contain rules that 
may appear to conflict with each other, making it difficult for 
even experienced practitioners to properly apply and follow.  
Among the most difficult of these arises when a client lies: 
the intersection of our obligations of client confidentiality 
and candor toward an adjudicative tribunal.  For immigration 
lawyers, this frequently manifests itself when we learn a client may 
have been untruthful in an adjudicative hearing.  It is in this zone 
of difficulty that many lawyers find themselves, seeking a path 
to extract their clients and themselves from a legal and 
ethical quagmire.278 
Note first, that in this example about honesty to the tribunal, that the 
lawyer has learned the client may have been untruthful.  Under most 
rules of practice, such ambiguity about whether the client actually was 
or was not untruthful permit the lawyer to continue representing the 
client without any duty to share any doubts with the Court.  The normal 
ethical standard imposing a duty to correct the record is “actual 
knowledge,”279  which does not seem to exist in this example.  However, 
in immigration court, the standard for knowledge included “reckless 
disregard” of the possibly false story.280  So, indeed, the rules do not just 
appear to conflict, in Trautz’s formulation; they do conflict. 
Professor Gilbert has laid out these dilemmas and tensions in her 
scholarship.281  In a wonderfully detailed case study (and one all too 
familiar to anyone who has represented clients in immigration court), 
she describes the multilayered dilemmas facing a particular pro bono 
attorney.  This attorney represented a woman who, among other issues, 
made questionable, if not illegal, decisions about who to claim as a 
dependent on her tax returns.  This issue put the lawyer in a bind as 
the immigration judge had demanded to see those tax returns as proof 
of the woman’s good moral character (a requirement for the relief 
being sought).  Gilbert explores the shades of whether the lawyer 
knew, suspected or recklessly disregarded information about the truth 
 
 278  Trautz, supra note 156.  
 279  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983). 
 280  8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(c) (2013). 
 281  Gilbert, supra note 198, at 234–36. 
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or falsity of those returns.282  Exploring client truthfulness is an issue 
familiar to all lawyers.283  But Gilbert explores how this tension is 
exacerbated by numerous factors: the burden on immigrants to 
provide such evidence; by the likelihood of even minor issues and 
discrepancies to undermine a legal case; and by the under-resourced 
overwhelmed nature of immigration court dockets—”an increasingly 
draconian legal environment,” as Gilbert describes it.284 
In Gilbert’s case study, the lawyer opts for solidarity with his client, 
and favors zealous advocacy over candor to the tribunal where those 
two values come into conflict.285  As she writes, 
Faced with an ethical dilemma that threatened to derail his 
client’s case, Attorney S considered not only the precise 
ethical issues he was facing, but the context in which the 
issues arose.  Attorney S was representing a client before a 
decidedly hostile government attorney and a judge with one 
of the highest denial rates in the country.  The stakes for his 
client were extremely high.  Failure to win at this stage of the 
proceedings on discretionary grounds was likely to result in 
Bertha’s immediate deportation.286 
Such a decision may have violated the ethical rules in the lawyer’s 
particular jurisdiction, because standards for what constitutes 
knowledge do vary across jurisdictions.  The decision also, though, 
almost certainly runs afoul of the EOIR rules, which favor candor to 
the tribunal and do not acknowledge the lawyer’s competing (and 
here, conflicting) duties to the client.287  Recognizing that the zealous 
lawyer may be liable for ethical violations, Gilbert worries about the 
“chilling effect” of the recklessness standard and concludes that” 
While the Model Rules would allow attorneys to exercise 
discretion and their own moral judgment in deciding 
whether to offer evidence they believe might be false, the 
EOIR/DHS Rules appear to require practitioners to evaluate 
the veracity of their clients’ testimony or the authenticity of 
their documentation and decline to offer such evidence if 
they suspect it may be false . . . .  Subjecting practitioners to 
disciplinary sanctions for offering probative evidence that 
the attorneys suspect may be false is likely to have a chilling 
 
 282  Id.  
 283  See generally Lisa G. Lerman & Philip G. Schrag, Lawyers’ Duties to Courts, 
Adversaries and Others: Truth and Falsity in Litigation, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW (3d ed. 2012). 
 284  Gilbert, supra note 198, at 220. 
 285  Id. at 258. 
 286  Id. at 258–59. 
 287  Id. 
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effect on advocacy, pose a serious threat to the independence 
of immigration practitioners, and result in abuse of authority 
by immigration judges and DHS, upon whom practitioners 
become dependent for the right to practice.288 
Gilbert closes her article by assessing that attorneys may be guided 
more by fear of liability under the EOIR rules, and less by the needs of 
their clients, an untenable situation.289 
Other dilemmas emerge in the context of an applicant’s criminal 
activity.  Frequently in immigration law, the structure of the process 
and the nature of the applications for relief from removal require the 
immigrant to incriminate him or herself in some criminal wrongdoing; 
forms for common applications like asylum or cancellation of removal 
ask about criminal offenses committed, and the inquiry is not limited 
to convictions.290  Regulations require that the attorney provide all the 
client’s criminal records to the Court.291  This is a reversal of the 
criminal context, where the Government has the duty to disclose 
exculpatory information,292 the defender has no affirmative duty to 
present any evidence at all, and the accused has the right to remain 
silent.  By contrast, here the immigrant—in removal, but affirmatively 
seeking something from the Government—has no such shields.  For 
the most part, because applicants’ biometric information is used to 
produce their criminal records,293 the duty is simply acquiescing to the 
inevitable with no actual harm done to the clients’ interests: the 
Government already possesses the information.  However, not all 
criminal records are equally readily available, and when the 
Government does not find a record, but it comes to the attention of 
the lawyer, the lawyer now faces the stark choice between honoring her 
duty to the Court, by producing the record, and her duty to her client, 
whose chance at relief may now be reduced or destroyed by the 
disclosure.  This is the scenario envisioned in the Cynthia case 
described at the beginning of this Article,294 when the lawyer dug with 
her client to discover where the mysterious missing conviction record 
 
 288  Id. 229–30. 
 289  Id. at 260. 
 290  EOIR Application for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain 
Nonpermanent Residents, at 5, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir42b.pdf ; USCIS Application for Asylum and 
Withholding of Removal, at 8, UCSIS.GOV (Dec. 29, 2014), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-589.pdf.  
 291  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (2013); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2013). 
 292  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 293  Fingerprints, UCSIS.GOV, http://www.uscis.gov/forms/fingerprints (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2015). 
 294  See Introduction, supra, and text accompanying notes 2–4. 
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might be found. 
In the moment before asking that digging question of the client, 
zealousness for the client should have stopped the student from 
inquiring further.  She had done her due diligence, and could honestly 
stand before the court and said “we went to the courthouses to get the 
records, and this conviction did not come up, and we do not know what 
it was about.”  Now, however, she knew.  And her duty to produce the 
record came into sharp conflict with her duty to her client—because 
the theft made her ineligible for Cancellation because it was 
considered an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.  Every 
actor in the Court that day felt a weight of frustration with this 
outcome.  The law prevented the Judge from granting the relief he 
thought she merited, and the student-attorneys, exercising their 
ethical obligations, had given him the information that led to that 
result. 
It is worth stepping back a moment and thinking about the 
competing purposes of these duties in the first place.  The duty to our 
clients is, of course, designed to promote trust so that the client can 
confide in the lawyer with the utmost confidence that her or his 
interests will be protected as a result of divulging the truth.  The duty 
to the court helps ensure a well-functioning legal system, one in which 
all the players can have confidence because all the actors are behaving 
according to known, understood, shared rules.  And the benefits are 
not just to the system, but also to the litigants.  A growing body of 
scholarship and empirical work on the idea of “procedural justice” 
shows that litigants value a fair system even when they ultimately lose 
their case.295  Lawyers, too, can derive satisfaction from an ethos of 
“playing by the rules”; respect for the rules feels virtuous, and can be 
far more comfortable that working along the edges of the rules and 
perhaps engaging in (civil) confrontation with opposing parties and 
the Court along the way. 
When such important duties collide, then, there is a significant 
cost.  What the dilemmas above show is that in immigration 
proceedings, where applicants must present information affirmatively 
in order to defend against removal, the client is wrong to trust the 
lawyer, because the lawyer is not always going to be able to protect the 
 
 295  Legal scholars have imported this idea from the realm of social psychology.  See, 
e.g., Deborah A. Goldfarb, Shaping Perceptions of Justice: A Familial Model of Procedural 
Justice, 82 UMKC L. REV. 465, 466 (2014) (citing, inter alia, John Thiabaut & Lauren 
Walker, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) and Rebecca 
Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS 
L.J. 127 (2011)). 
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client’s confidences so long as duties to the court triumph over duties 
to the client.296  And there is a true cost associated with that for the 
client.  But the costs do not stop with the client; they also extend to the 
system as a whole, which is predicated on clients trusting their lawyers.  
There are myriad reasons ex ante why clients might not trust their 
lawyers—from the reputation of the immigration bar generally to 
cultural views about lawyers to more individual fears about engaging 
with authority figures—and in the immigration context, people are 
sometimes coming from countries where lawyers are not as 
independent as they are in the United States.297  Now, to a situation 
where trust is difficult to establish, we add structural factors that make 
trust even riskier—and we set up incentives for savvy clients, and 
perhaps all clients, to be less than fully honest with their attorneys.  In 
such a context, the goals of the legal system itself are ill-served. 
C. Ways Through the Impasse 
As the above scenarios suggest, commitment to a principle of 
zealous advocacy could provide a useful and necessary counterbalance 
to the skewed adversarial world of immigration court.  A well-
articulated principle could become a touchstone for attorneys going 
against the current cultural grain, and help build a new legal culture 
within the world of immigration court.  This Article has begun the 
work of providing the theoretical justification for such a principle, and 
has demonstrated numerous contexts in which it would make a 
significant difference to the conduct and outcome of immigration 
removal cases.  The simplest conclusion to draw from this is that 
leaders of the bar, mentors to new attorneys, and teachers of law 
students must do more to articulate, elevate, and embody this principle 
so that cultural change will follow. 
A principle of zealous advocacy is not all-powerful, however.  
Given that there are situations where the rules of professional conduct 
in immigration court actually prevent a lawyer from being a zealous 
advocate for her client, what are the lawyer’s options?  Hew to the 
lowest common denominator, being as zealous as the court-favoring 
rules permit (which is not particularly zealous)?  Advocate for a change 
in the rules that will permit ethical practice that also allows for 
 
 296  Stephen Ellman portrays this dilemma starkly in his article on the ethics of 
interviewing. Stephen Ellman, Truth and Consequences, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 895 (2000). 
 297  See, e.g., 2014 Report of Special Rapporteur on the Country Visit to El Salvador, at ¶¶ 
90–95, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (May 
24, 2013), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/ 
23/43/Add.1. 
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zealousness?  Determine that those rules are morally inferior and thus 
less worthy of respect?  Engage in civil disobedience to defy the rules? 
The last two options fail for different reasons.  Indeed, though 
similar in act—breaking the rules—the two options differ importantly.  
Disregarding rules from a private judgment that the rules lack moral 
authority is not the same as civil disobedience.  Civil disobedience 
requires making the disagreement public, and accepting the legal 
consequences of violating the rules.  This Article in no way endorses 
the view that rules may simply be ignored—indeed, much of the 
analysis above shows simply how to work more zealously within these 
existing rules, flawed as they sometimes are. 
This Article also suggests now that the time is not right for civil 
disobedience.  The argument for civil disobedience is that lawyers are 
being asked to resolve irresolvable moral tensions.  Arguably, when two 
sets of professional conduct rules permit two different outcomes, as in 
this hypothetical, the one more favorable to duties to the client should 
outweigh the one set by the court itself: as a moral issue, the two are 
not equal, as one set of rules was developed by lawyers who endure the 
competing duties, and the other set was developed by a court with a 
strong self-interest in favoring the duty to the court over duties to the 
client.  Civil disobedience is a way of expressing dissent with that status 
quo, and lawyers do have a right and an ability to engage in civil 
disobedience,298 but civil disobedience is truly justified when the legal 
system fails to accommodate any other forms of dissent, and where 
dissent through lawful channels has been stifled and stymied.299  It is 
not the case that lawful channels have been exhausted on this issue; 
indeed, very little action has taken place beyond regulatory comments, 
to even raise the difficulties explored in this Article.  Furthermore, as 
a practical point, the question of lawyers engaging in civil disobedience 
has been justified in the context of actions taken outside of the lawyer’s 
client matters (civil disobedience on issues of concern to the public, 
not to a particular client).  A lawyer’s stance in protesting a policy by, 
for example, being part of a sit-in at the Capitol to get arrested, is 
unlikely to directly affect the lawyer’s clients.300  But any act of civil 
disobedience in the context of a removal proceeding would likely 
result in chaos, impossible disruptions to the legal process, and severe 
 
 298  Robert M. Palumbos, Within Each Lawyer’s Conscience a Touchstone: Law, Morality, 
and Attorney Civil Disobedience, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (2005). 
 299  Id. 
 300  If newsworthy enough, perhaps a judge or ICE attorney would hear of it and 
that could affect their attitudes to the lawyer and, by extension, to the lawyer’s clients, 
but the risks of this seem attenuated at best. 
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prejudice to the client.301 
Nor is hewing to an ethical “lowest common denominator” a 
sufficient response.  A typical view taken from a different sphere of 
immigration practice (business immigration) suggests that “[d]espite 
the complexity of the client’s situation, it is always prudent to remain well 
within the boundary line of what is ethical.  Since this boundary line is often 
amorphous and can shift, subject to varying interpretations, why should the 
lawyers take a risk?”302  Although written about a different context, this 
quotation also seemingly describes too much of immigration removal 
practice.  The Article has shown that in removal proceedings, the 
answer to “why take a risk” is the very nature of the proceedings, the 
stakes involved, and the disparities of power between the sides. 
In removal proceedings, hewing to safe, familiar standards (ones 
that do not elevate zealous advocacy as the guiding principle) is likely 
to set up the client to lose in any collision between duties to the court 
and duties to the client.  So many factors work against immigrants in 
the removal system that their representatives must approach the 
boundary lines wherever possible, and seek to push those boundaries 
where there are decent arguments to do so.  And as the previous 
sections have shown, it is possible to be far more zealous within the 
confines of those boundary lines than might seem possible from the 
vantage point of a risk-averse legal culture. 
Zealous advocacy can often be as ethical as a more conservative 
approach, even when it feels like it is a risk.  And when an ethical 
strategy or approach works to the advantage of the client, the client’s 
interests must be foremost on their representatives’ minds, thus 
forcing an effective lawyer to reject a safer option chosen merely 
because it is safe. 
The first significant way through the impasses sketched above, 
therefore, is a simple one—to elevate the principle of zealous advocacy 
such that it feels like a routine, expected choice and not a risky one.  
Changing the legal culture to embrace principles of zealous advocacy 
will encourage the risk-averse to see their zone of permissible, ethical 
conduct more broadly and to approach the boundary lines more 
fearlessly. 
 
 
 301  How, for example, could a lawyer forthrightly disavow a duty to the court 
without indirectly revealing that the client has something negative the lawyer is 
refusing to disclose? 
 302  Cyrus D. Mehta, Howard S. Myers & Kathleen Campbell Walker, How to Walk the 
Ethical Line: Being Less Stressed Out 51 (2011), available at http://www.ailawebcle.org/ 
resources/Resources%20for%2012-13-11%20Seminar.pdf. 
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The second way through the impasse is to identify the areas where 
zealous advocacy—and therefore effective lawyering—is impossible, 
and begin challenging the structures that give rise to these 
impossibilities, including the rules of conduct for immigration 
practitioners themselves.  This Article has attempted to identify some 
of those areas, but has just begun a task worthy of fuller development.  
But even just drawing from two of the impossible situations described 
above, we could imagine immigration attorneys deploying regulatory 
processes, advocacy or impact litigation to alter the underlying 
problems giving rise to the ethical dilemmas.  For example, attorneys 
could seek to renegotiate the terms of EOIR’s rules governing 
professional conduct of immigration practitioners, so that the 
recklessness test is abated, or could file a lawsuit challenging the 
overbroad formulation of the question on the U visa application 
seeking information about offenses ever committed, as ultra vires.303  
Lobbying, negotiating, defining rules, and challenging rules are all 
tasks that lawyers are well-equipped to engage in, and advocacy by 
lawyers in these and other areas could prove effective for removing the 
source of some of the dilemmas this article has described. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
As immigration laws and enforcement of those laws have become 
more severe, and as appointed counsel increases in the world of 
immigration, the time is right to think thoroughly and creatively about 
how immigration lawyers can be more effective, individually and 
collectively, as the “immigration bar.”  While the efforts to reduce the 
worst practices and remove the worst offenders are critical, these 
efforts are insufficient in the face of the enormous challenges and 
burdens immigrants face in the removal system.  A higher standard is 
needed, and zealous advocacy is a critical piece of that high standard.  
With zealous advocacy as the baseline, as a core, guiding principle for 
immigration lawyers, lawyers will be empowered to take stronger 
stances in defense of their clients—demanding every advantage 
ethically permitted to advance the interested of their clients, without 
crossing over into unethical behavior.  As Abbe Smith exhorted in the 
criminal context, “Although a defender must act within the bounds of 
the law, he or she should engage in advocacy that is as close to the line 
 
 303  The question does not elicit legally relevant information for screening an 
individual for admissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act; the other more 
narrowly tailored questions on the form do implement the admissibility screening 
contained in the INA, but this question does not, and eliminating it would remove the 
dilemma for practitioners. 
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as possible, and, indeed, should test the line, if it is in the client’s 
interest in doing so.”304  The same is true for those engaging in the 
defense of immigrants facing removal.  This Article has shown how 
often this can be done without subverting existing rules, and calls upon 
immigration practitioners to identify and challenge the barriers to 
zealous advocacy that still remain.  The nature of the task—defending 
clients against removal to other countries, separation from their 
families and lives they have built here—demands that we challenge the 
borders of expected behavior in immigration court, by pushing against 
prevailing norms, and raising the bar of what constitutes truly effective 
lawyering. 
 
 
 304  Smith, supra note 55, at 89–91.  
